THE DEADWEIGHT OF FORMULAE:
WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE SECOND GERMANIZATION
OF AMERICAN EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW
Alexander Somek*

I.

OCCASIONS FOR MISUNDERSTANDING

Judicial ingenuity is not assured by a rule of inalienability. On the
contrary, as a public good, judicial doctrine is subject to a kind of
non-rival consumption. Often, courts sense that it may be beneficial
to adopt solutions or standards invented by judicial bodies in other
countries, and they may then decide to incorporate these foreign
standards into their own jurisprudence.' This relationship is seen in
the interaction between truly inventive judges and more cautious judicial bodies. For instance, it seems as if the common vocabulary of
modem human rights jurisprudence would not have been possible
without examples from courts such as the German Federal Constitutional Court (the "German Court") and the mediating European
Court of Human Rights. These courts more or less set the tone that
other courts, sometimes reluctantly, followed.3
* Professor of Law, University of Vienna, Faculty of Law. The author would like to thank
VickyJackson, Philip C. Kissam, Seth Kreimer, Richard L. Levy, Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger and
Stanely Paulson for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. The University of PennslyvaniaJournal of Constitutional Law has not verified the content of the German sources cited
in this Article.
I The Supreme Court of the State of Israel is the most impressive example of such constitutional borrowing. Reading the opinions, one cannot but acknowledge that it is the most important comparative constitutional law institute of the world. Partly, this success stems from the
the Court's practice of employing clerks from all over the world, who do the research work on
their country of origin. On the development of the Court's basic rights jurisprudence, see
David Kretzmer, Democracy in the Jurisprudenceof the Supreme Court of Israe 26 ISRAEL YEARBOOK
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 267-88 (1996).
2 See Manfred Stelzer, Stand und Perspektiven des Grundrechtsschutzes,
in 75 JAHRE
BUNDESVERFASSUNG 585, 586 (G. Schefbeck ed. 1995);Joseph H.H. Weiler, FundamentalRights
and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and Values in the Protection of Human Rights, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 51, 53-55 (N. A. Neuwahl & A. Rosas eds., 1995). On the
substantial convergence of the jurisprudence of courts, see ALEXANDER V. BRONNECK,
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT
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DEMOKRATIEN.

EIN

SYSTEMATISCHER

VERFASSUNGSVERGLEICH 125-32 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1992).

3 On the late Germanization and Europization of the jurisprudence
of the Austrian Constitutional Court, see Alexander Somek, Conflicting Conceptions of HigherLaw: Austria and the European Trend inJudicialReview of Legislation, in TOWARD A EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE (A. M. Rabello
ed., forthcoming 1999).
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It must not be overlooked, however, that uninvited doctrinal takings, as an important subclass of constitutional borrowings, are subject to intrinsic constraints. After all, at least some requirement of
national "fit," or specificity, ought to be expected. It is difficult to
imagine, for example, that any court in the world could adopt the
unique Austrian doctrine of "petrification" in allocating powers. The
"petrification" doctrine is a truly esoteric doctrine arising from Austrian history and, as such, any foreign court flirting with its adoption
would find itself, to say the least, exposed to great bewilderment.
Conspicuous incommensurabilties aside, even feasible doctrinal takings arise from a specific tradition. A two-fold effect, therefore, is to
be expected. First, as a result of grafting a piece of doctrine onto an
established jurisprudential scheme, the latter must be restructured in
order to introduce the new element. Second, by reacting to what is
taken into it, the restructured jurisprudential context must also assimilate the alien doctrinal element. In this respect, doctrinal takings
are subject, by their very nature, to reception failure, or, "creative destruction." 5 The element taken from one constitutional tradition is
reinterpreted from the perspective of the other. Ironically, the constitutional lender is compensated for its ingenuity by the borrower's
lack of understanding, which is owed to the fact that the latter must
carry the burden of its own constitutional past.
The above insights should be relatively familiar to those who have
reflected on the basic insights of hermeneutics. As we shall see, however, the subject matter becomes more engaging when constitutional
borrowings involve simultaneous external and internal references.
Such dual references exist where a court uses a foreign example to
expand the scope of its own evolving doctrine. From the outset,
then, the reference to an external example is intended to bridge the
gap in the development and clarification of internal, homemade classifications. The external element provides what appears to be a missing link, or, borrowing from bio-technical jargon, the genetic "vector"
required for the transmission.
The interaction of external and internal references involved in the
process of doctrinal evolution opens a field of new possibilities, the
results of which may be remarkable. With constitutional borrowing,
4 According to the "petrification theory," undefined words and phrases of the Constitution
have to be construed with precise reference to the content of regulations, below the level of
constitutional law, in existence at the time of its adoption. &e Ewald %Viederin.An.,rkung'rn zu"
Versteinerungstheorie in 1ESTCHRFiRTGONTHlER WINMK.ER 1231-32 (E. Wiederin et al.eds., 1997).
The basic idea is that when the constitutional lau%makers said that the federal legislature shall
have power to regulate all "private law" relationships. "private law" meant the type of regulations contained in the civil code in force at the time this provision of the Constitution %%senacted.
5 Readers might notice the self-reference. The metaphor is taken from Schumpeter's
characterization of economic competition and applied in a different context. Its meaning is thereby
altered. SeeJoSEPHA. SCHUMP=ER, CAPrrAuSM, SoctAus.i. AND DFtOcR','c81 (4th ed. 1975).
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the original, once-singular doctrinal context of the lender transforms
into a maze of interpretations by the borrower, resulting in communication between sometimes incommensurate categories.6 It is no
wonder that academic observers are sometimes left in a quandary.
Such observers might be forced to admit that a constitutional borrowing may render an entire doctrinal context obscure.
II. THE MALAISE OF A PECULIAR GERMAN ESTEEM FOR A SPECIFIC
COMPONENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Even inventive judicial bodies, such as the German Court, occa6

For heuristic purposes, this article will distinguish three effects that we are likely to attrib-

ute to constitutional borrowing. First, there is the happy case, clearly cherished by Whig historians and their modem successors. In such a happy case scenario, constitutional borrowings are
depicted as instances of a world-wide expansion of liberty and the rule of law. Hence, once
borrowings attain a certain level of consolidation they are referred to as "historical influences"
or lines of historical development. One of the most obvious examples, the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, corresponds almost word-for-word with an existing provision
in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 "that excessive bail ought not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." As is well known, a similar comparison could be made between the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the provision of the English Bill of Rights granting the right to "have arms to their defense,
suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law."
Second, there is the more complicated case. This represents the standard or default case of
constitutional borrowing. Not surprisingly, it is marked by an interaction or even a conflict between different constitutional cultures. One need not be a student of philosophical hermeneutics in order to understand that the borrowing of a certain component of constitutional law
does not leave its meaning unaffected. On the other hand, the integration of a foreign component into a domestic constitutional context also has an impact on the latter. There is a subtle
and, indeed, unpredictable interaction between the borrowed element and the receiving context. However, what distinguishes this second case from the third is that, after a period of mutual adaptation, a constitutional culture may finally arrive at novel and, more or less, stable
meanings. The transformation of the American rational basis test into the German arbitrariness standards exemplifies this process of mutual adaptation and subsequent consolidation.
Third, there is what I would like to refer to as the unremittingly confusing case. In this third
type of case, constitutional borrowing may eventually give rise to settled practice of constitutional law, but this practice cannot be conceived of as a practice of constitutional interpretation.
This article does not claim that the resulting practice of constitutional law does not lend itself to
description; yet it cannot be described in the terms of the application of a legal rule, since the
borrowing is the source of a relentless conflict of interpretations. As is well known, a practice of
following a normative directive exists only if it is fortified by a unified account of what it means
to follow such a directive. There is, however, no straightforward way to follow a rule, since the
communal practice of following a rule, as we are told by the champions of legal positivism, presupposes a critical reflective attitude on the part of those monitoring its application. If, however, the accounts given from such a reflective perspective are invariably in opposition to each
other, we are committed to embrace the conclusion that, even in spite of an incessant reference
to certain directives, there is no single rule governing the practice. Although the ongoing practice may be described in various ways and involves certain regularities, it cannot be described in
the terms of following a rule of law. If constitutional borrowing is involved in bringing about
such a situation, we are confronted with an unremittingly confusing case. It is not just that the
b6rrowed element and the receiving context change their meanings in the process of merging
into a different kind of practice. Instead, in such a case, both the borrowed element and the
receiving context are in danger of losing their meaning altogether.
7 See DAVID P. CURRIE. THE CONsTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERIMANY 340
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sionally use foreign examples in their decisions. One specific example concerns the apparently straightforward design of different standards of general equal protection review. In the 1980s, the German
Court began borrowing from the United States Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence. 8 This instance of borrowing is particularly intriguing since what initially was perceived to be an Americanization of German doctrinal standards now may be understood as
a mere extension of one of the most prominent principles of the
German Court's homemade jurisprudence.
At least on its own account, with an eye to "quasi-suspect" differential treatment of groups, the German Court now applies the proportionality principle to equal protection review.9 This doctrinal
transformation, however, was mainly carried out on the formulaic
level ofjudicial review. Upon closer inspection, it appears that there
is a shrouded disparity between what the German Court claims to do
and what it actually does.
In the end, a borrowing that was meant to consolidate a confounded field of precedents is now open to at least three conflicting
interpretations. According to the first interpretation, the German
Court successfully engaged in an Americanization of German doctrine. For the sake of distinction, this article will refer to this first interpretation as the "comparative account."' According to the second
interpretation, the German Court did indeed introduce the proportionality test into its equal protection review. This article terms this
second interpretation the "official account," for it conforms to what
the German Court, at least its First Senate, claims to be doing." According to the third interpretation, which this article terms
the "die2
hard account," nothing (or only very little) has changed.'
This article wvill defend a version of the die-hard account that
resonates with ajustifiable skepticism for the process of constitutional
borrowing. Such skepticism stems from the inherent inconsistencies
in the application of borrowed constitutional doctrine as revealed by
a critical reading of relevant precedents.'" In practice, the German

(1994) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE CONSTIrrLON ] (discussing the implementation of competing interests in German constitutional jurisprudence).
See infrasection Ill.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 169-172 (explaining that the reasons for a differential
treatment of groups must have sufficient weight).
10 See, ag., Konrad Hesse, Der Gldchsteatz in der neuaen deutsdien Terfassungsu't*lung. 109
ARCHIV DES 6F.N'TLics_ REcm-s 174, 188-89 (1984) [hereinafter Hesse, Der Gchhnwtat].
" See notably BVerfGE 88, 87 (97). For hornbook expositions of that account. see Bono
PIEROTH & BERNHARD SCHLuNK, GRUNDREcHTE. STAATSRECHT H 103.04 (RZ 438-40) (Heidelberg: C.F. Mfiller 13th ed. 1997); GERmrI MANSSEN, 2 STAATSREcH:. GRVNDREcHTDOCMGTIK
207-09 (RZ 700-11) (FranzVahlen 1995).
12 See, e-g., Werner Heun, ArL 3, in GRUNDGESErZ, 228, 246 (RZ 28)
(H. Dreier cd., Tfibingen: Mohr & Siebeck 1996); ALBERT BLEcIawA',N. DIE STRUKTUR DES .kLCGEMINTN
GLVIcHHrrssATzES 88 (Carl Heymann 1995).
13 See infra section XV.
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Court has attempted to apply borrowed constitutional provisions in
such a manner that routinely falls short of meeting the German
Court's idealized approach to equal protection review. Thus, the following analysis of the evolution of equal protection review doctrine is
in essence a story about formulae and their failure to instruct. 4 A
close reading of the German Court's tinkering with purportedly different but nevertheless similar standards of equal protection review
reveals that constitutional borrowings based on generalities are likely
to miss their target. The article also strives to offer a better understanding of the implications of the judicial administration of formulae regarding the power it confers on those who substitute self-made
guidelines for what the people, however naively, take to be higher
law.'5 For our purposes, it is most convenient to begin with the comparative account in order to most effectively contrast the die-hard account with the other two other accounts.
III. THE COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT

According to most commentators, general equal protection review
in the Federal Republic of Germany has undergone significant
changes in the last few years. 6 The German Court's review method
appears to shift from the traditional arbitrariness standard (Willkiirverbot)'7 to a two-tiered form of review that resembles the American
model established and sustained in such leading cases as Korematsu v.
United States8 and Regents of the Univ. of Californiav. Bakke

9

Konrad

14 See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES

OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 151-53 (1989) (discussing the formulaic style of the U.S. Supreme Court in

Regents of the Univ. of Calforniav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which the Court examined the
application of the Equal Protection Clause to race-based classifications).
See id. at 127, 135 (emphasizing the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court's powerful "style
of expression" on people's interpretation of authority).
16 See, e.g., HANS D. JARASS & BODO PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ

FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND 86, 96-97 (Munich: C.H. Beck 3d ed. 1995); Konrad Hesse, Der ailgemeine Gleich-

heitssatz in der neueren Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Rechtssetzungsgleichheit, in
WEGE UND VERFAHREN DES VERFASSUNGSLEBENS 121-31 (Festschrift Peter Lerche) (P. Badura &
R. Scholz eds., Munich: C.H. Beck 1993) [hereinafter Hesse, Der ailgemeine Gleichheitssatz];
Manfred Gubelt, Art. 3 Gleichheit, in 1 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR 219, 231 (Ingo Von Mfinch &
Philip Kunig eds., Munich: C.H. Beck, 4th ed. 1992); Friedrich Schoch, Der Gleichheitssatz, 103
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr 863, 875-876 (1988); Gerhard Robbers, Der Gleichheitssatz, in 41
DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 749, 751-752 (1988); Rainald MaaB, Die neuere Rechtsprechung des
BVerJG zum allgemeinen Gleichheitssatz Ein Neuansatz?, in NEUE ZEITSCHRIF FOR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 14 (1988); Hesse, Der Gleichheitssatz,supra note 10, at 188-89.
17 Currie translates "Willkfirverbot" as "arbitrariness standard." See David P. Currie,
Lochner
Abroad: Substantive Due Process and EqualProtection in the FederalRepublic of Germany, 1989 SUP. CT.
REV. 333, 369 (Gerhard Casper & DennisJ. Hutchinson eds., 1990) [herinafter Currie, Lochner
Abroad] (discussing the tendency to replace the arbitrariness standard with "sufficient to justify"). On the role of United States v. CaroleneProds.Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), see John
Galotto, Strict Strutinyfor Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 513 (1993) discussing footnote four as the Court's first attempt to reconcile the Equal Protection Clause as an "edict prohibiting race discrimination" and as a standard based on legislative means and ends.
18 See 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (evaluating the constitutionality of an exclusion order). On the
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Hesse, a former member of the German Court, suggests that the
Court's evolving equal protection doctrine is best understood by considering the basic American pattern.-" According to Hesse, the longestablished standard, similar to the principle governing American rational basis review, that the legislature should not act arbitrarily vis-fivis its citizens is now supplemented with a more searching inquiry in
cases where government action "threatens to upset basic conditions
of human existence and conduct." 2' According to the comparative
account, the German Court adopted the United States Supreme
Court's distinctive levels of scrutiny as its model for review analysis.H
Recent judicial decisions reinforce this account.2s Undeniably, the
comparative account has its virtues; one being the sense of unity it
lends to an otherwise confusing body of precedents. 2 It seems as if
the German Court, in particular its First Senate,2 repeatedly employs
a "formula" that explicitly distinguishes between normal and heightened equal protection scrutiny.' However, the German Court, at
least according to its official account, assimilated the "American" distinction between different levels of equal protection scrutiny into its
matrix of domestic constitutional doctrine by incorporating the proportionality principle (Ver ltnisnfiigteitspiinzip)into its upper ier."'
It therefore appears as if the borrowing of a prominent theory developed by the United States Supreme Court wras superseded by the
amendment of a domestic principle alien to the American strict equal
protection scrutiny based upon suspect classifications.2s Rather than
role of United States v. CarolineProds. Co., 304 U.S. 144. 152 n. 4 (1938). see Galotto, supra note
17, at 513-14.
'9 See 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (applying equal protection analysis to cLassifications based on
race).

20 See Hesse, Deralgemeine Gkiczheitssatz, supra note 16, at 197.
21See id. at 131.
22 SeeMaaB, supranote 16, at 17.
23 See id. at 17-18.
24 SeeHesse, Der agemeine Ceidchhssatz,supra note 16, at 123. 125-26.
25 The Second Senate followed the formula only occasionally and with reluctance. See BVer-

fGE 75, 108 (157); BVerfGE 76, 256 (329-30); BVerfGE 78, 249 (287); BVerfGE 92. 277 (218).
The American courts have developed a two- and three-tier equal protection review. See
Gerald Gunther, In Search ofEvolvingDoctrineon a Changing Court A Model For a ,Aewer Equal Prote/tion, 86 HARV. L REV. 1, 8-10 (1972) [hereinafter Gunther, In Search ofEvaoingDctmnne] (discussing the strict scrutiny in 'new' equal protection vs. the minimal scrutiny in 'old' equal protection); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTTUTIOAL LMW 587-91 (1' ed. 1985); JIDrTH A. BAER.
EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENiTH AMEDIENT 112-13
(1983) (discussing the "roots of suspect class"); Galouo, supra note 17, at 513-18 (discussing the
development of the different standards of review beginning with CarotenePrduct and following
through to affirmative action cases).
This is true in the eyes of one dissenting judge and most of the commentators. See BVerfME 74, 9 (28) (Katzenstein,J., dissenting); Gubelt, supra note 16, at 231; PIEROTH & SCtLIN4.
supranote 11, at 104; MaaB, supranote 16, at 16-17; Robbers, supra note 16, at 751-52; Hesse, Der
agke="ne Gkidiheitssatz, supranote 16, at 123.
See Frank L Michelnan, Foreward, On Protectingthe Poor Through the Fourteenth Arendynent,
83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 33-34 (1969) (identifying the government's implication in s)stematic inequality where the government acts to 'classify[ ]' persons so as to extend to them unequal
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importing the distinctive level of scrutiny model, the new standard,
instead, is similar to the American "fundamental interest" approach.&9
To date, because implementation of the new standard has not yet
become a routine practice of the German Court, despite its statement
of formulae, the importance of the standard has also not been firmly
establisheds ° According to defenders of the die-hard account, characterizing the new standard as an "Americanization" of general equal
protection review encourages the mypoic views of those who cling to
formulae."' Thus, a great deal of German substantive equal protection doctrine is still inclined to downplay the impact of the more recent formula of review 2 and to propose review standards that are only
partially supported by precedent.
A remarkable facet of this conflict in interpretation is the fact that
the development of the new formula of review took shape from
within an Americanized field. Although German constitutional law
already reflected the different strands of equal protection review, the
German Court reintroduced the American distinction into a field already built on the American model. In sections four through nine,
this article will first provide a brief sketch of the period before the alleged second Americanization took place, then the article will turn to
the evolution of what is now known as the "New Formula." The two
final sections will address why the skeptical version of the die-hard account is the most convincing.

IV. THE ESTABLISHED UPPER TIER: ARTICLE 3 (3) OF THE BASIC
LAW

treatments").
29 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) ("[We] have treated
as presumptively invidious
those classifications that ... impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right.'"). One may
have reason to doubt, however, whether the relevant string of precedents is adequately understood by claiming that it represents equal protection scrutiny. See MichaelJ. Perry, Modern Equal
Protection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1078, 1081 (1979) (discussing cases that had nothing to do with equal protection and the imposition of a negative conditionSee Hesse, Der Gleichheitssatz, supra note 10, at 191.
See, e.g., Heun, supra note 12, at 246.
See id. at 243. See also Paul Kirchhof, Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz, in 5 HANDBUCH DES
STAATSRECirrs DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 837, 934-36, 947-48 (Josef Isensee & Paul
Kirchhof eds. 1992); Ekkehart Stein, Art. 3 (Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz), in 1 ALTERNATIVKOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 306 (E. Denninger, ct.
al., Neuwied: Luchterhand, 2d ed. 1989) [herinafter Stein, Art. 3]; Christoph Gusy, Der Gkichheitssatz, 41 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2505 (1988). As Currie correctly observes, the
list of suspect classifications is longer than the United States' list. See CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 324.
31
3

3s See

STEFAN

HUSTER,

REcHTE

UND

ZIELE.

ZUR

DOGMATIK

DES

ALLGEMEINEN

GLEICHHEITSSATZES 226-42 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1993) [herinafter HUSTER, REcIITE
UND ZIELE]. For a brief exposition of the basic ideas expressed in this book, see Stefan Huster,
Gleichheit und Verhltnismufligkeit: Der algemeine Gleichheitssatz als Eingnffsrecht, 11

JURISTENZEITUNG 541 (1994) [hereinafter Huster, Gleichheit und Verhdltnismiifligkeit].
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In cases pertaining to Article 3, § 3 of the German Constitution,
termed the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of
M the German Court has, more or less consistently, apGermany,s
pealed to heightened scrutiny. In contrast to the German Equal Protection Clause of Article 3, § 1, which provides generally that "all persons shall be equal before the law,"" Article 3, § 3 expressly prohibits,
in particular, any adverse or preferential treatment on the basis of
sex, birth, race, language, national or social origin, faith, or political
opinion.36 An amendment passed in 1994 affords special protection
to persons suffering from mental or physical disabilities." In addition
to Article 3, the Basic Law contains additional, special equal protection clauses, including provisions for the following- equality of the
rights and duties of citizenship (Article 33, § 1) ;t3 a guarantee of the
equal access to public office (Article 33, §2);" voting equality (Article
38, §1); and equality of religious confessions and congregations (Article 4, §§ I & 2).41 The German Court does not immediately consider legislative classifications in violation of these provisions to be fadally invalid,4 but instead, subjects such classifications to a more
See THE BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER.AN" 14 (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1989) (English translation of the German constitution)
[herinafter THE BASIC LAW]; see also, the translation found in THE CoNsTIT'TIION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE B.SIC LAW
im-h ATRANSLATION OFTHE BASIC LAW 227 (U. Karpen, ed., 1988).
SeeTHE BASIC LAw, supranote 34, at 14.
S6 See i& at 14 ("No one may be disadvantaged or favoured because of his sex, his parentage,
his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.").
The second sentence of Art. 3 § 3 of the Basic Law reads: 'No one may be disadvantaged
because of a handicap."
3 SeeTHE BASIC LAW, supranote 34, at 28 ('Every German shall have in every Land the same
political (staatsbuergerlich) rights and duties.").
See id. ("Every German shall be equally eligible for any public office according to his aptitude, qualifications and professional achievements.").
40 See i&. at 30 ('The deputies to the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct.
free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound
by orders and instructions, and shall be subject only to their conscience.").
41 See id. at 14-15 ("Freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom to profess a religion or
a
particular philosophy (Weltanschauung) shall be inviolable[.] The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed."). See also, CURRIE, THE CONSTITTION, supra note 7, at 323 (offering an overviev of the Basic Law). For an extensive commentary, see Gfinter Drig, Art. 3 § 1, in
1 GRUNDGESETz 301-30 (RZ 30-196) (Theodore Maunz et al. eds., Munich: C.H. Beck, 7th ed.
1994). On the affirmative duty of treating men and women alike, see the study by Ute Sacksofsky, DAS GRUNDRECHT AUF GLEICHBERECHTIGUNG. EINE RECHTSDOcMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG
ZUARTImEL3 ABSATz 2 DES GRUNDGESETZES (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991).
If such legislative dassifications were considered automatically invalid on their face, Art. 3,
§ 3 would amount to what Sunstein refers to as a "rights-constraint" on government's preferences. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferecesand the Constitution, 84 COLUmt L REv. 1689, 1704
(1984).
Under this approach, the category of rights would create a shield of private
autonomy into which the government could not intrude, regardless of the
reasons for the attempted intrusion. As a result, invalidation would be
automatic, and heightened scrutiny unnecessary.
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penetrating review. 43 This closer scrutiny is applied by the German
Court, in particular, where legislative classifications draw on the essentially immutable characteristics enumerated in Article 3, § 3."
With respect to gender discrimination, Article 3, § 3 is generally construed as strictly prohibiting all differential treatment and, therefore,
the provision is understood to screen out some illegitimate ends of
government action. 5 When faced with a legislative classification that
involves the immutable characteristics listed in Article 3, § 3, the
German Court regularly subjects the "suspect" classification to a
means-ends test. This test is designed to ascertain whether the differential treatment either follows from the application of a different criterion 46 that would turn the suspect classification into a "proxy." Alternatively, the test seeks to determine whether the differentiation
follows from a reflection of differences firmly rooted in the "nature of
things," rather than from prejudice or "archaic and overbroad generalizations." 7 The latter test was applied in a case dealing with a statId.
43 Strict scrutiny is applied because the Basic Law itself seems
to have established the relevant criteria for equal treatment. See e.g., Hesse, Der Gleichheitssatz, supra note 10, at 184. For
cases and commentary on the equal right to vote and political participation, see, for example,
BVerfGE 4, 375 (384); BVerfGE 51, 222 (235-236); BVerfGE 71, 81 (96). See also, HUSTER,
REcHTE UND ZIELE, supra note 33, at 352-56; Hans Herbert von Arnim, Derstrengeund derfonnale
Gleichheitssatz, 37 DIE OIFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 85-92 (1984). No clear doctrine governing all
kinds of cases can be articulated, however. Initially, what may be termed "causality review" provided a common theme, indicating that a regulation is constitutionally void only if the trait
mentioned in Art. 3, § 3 is the "cause" of discrimination. SeeJARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 16, at
113, 121; Gubelt, supra note 16, at 294-95. On the severe problems and, hence, gradual demise
of this kind of review, see Heun, supranote 12, at 286-87 (RZ 105-110).
See Currie, LochnerAbroad, supra note 17, at 364 n. 239. Currie correctly attests
that scrutiny has been truly strict only with respect to gender classifications, even though not always "fatal in fact. For commentary on the relatively low level of protection afforded to political opinion, see Heun, supra notel 2, at 290 (RZ 119); CURRIE, THE CONSTrrION, supra note 7, at 32528. 45
See PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note
11, at 106 (RZ 447); Gubelt, supra note
16, at 294.
Some commentators place the emphasis on the means and hold that some criteria of differentiation are prohibited by the Constitution. See, eg., Stein, supra note 32, at 342; Gusy, supra note
32, at 2508. SeegeneraUy, Sunstein, supranote 42, at 1715.
46 See, e.g., BVerfGE 3, 225 (241); BVerfGE 57, 335 (342-343).
It remains unclear whether
this principle applies only to statutes that are discriminatory on their face or also to statutes that
are facially neutral (and therefore involve an "indirect discrimination"). For an account of this
discussion, see Heun, supra note 12, at 281. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied different
standards to facially-neutral statutes with a racially disproportionate impact and to statutes that
contain provisions of equal, but separate treatment for each race. Compare Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a racially disparate impact does not render a statute per se
unconstitutional) with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (noting the fact of equal but separate application of a statute to different races does not immunize a statute from the heavy burden ofjustification that the Fourteenth Amendment requires of state stautes drawn according
to race).
47 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating
the social security
system provision that differentiated among covered employees based solely on sex. The distinction was based on the archaic and overbroad generalization not tolerated under the U.S. Constitution, that male workers' earnings, unlike those of female workers, are vital to their families'
support); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking down a gender-based provision in
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ute that banned women from working during the night. "' At the outset of the opinion, the German Court proclaimed that Art. 3, § 3 forbids the attachment of unequal legal consequences to gender-specific
classifications.49 In marked contrast to previous decisions in which
regulations, discriminatory on their face, were upheld unless there
was proof of a discriminatory purpose,5 the Court has inaugurated
the principle that differential treatment of men and women cannot
pass constitutional muster, even if such differentiation functions as a
means in pursuit of some beneficial and legitimate goal.' In its overall design, the Court's methodology effectively elevated to the level of
strict scrutiny what the United States Supreme Court previously developed, in such cases as Rostker v.Goldberg 2 or Michael M. v. Sonoma
M
Super. Ct,5 3 as intermediate review for gender classifications
County

based upon alleged natural differences. In contrast to the United
States Supreme Court's intermediate review standard for gender classifications, the German Court held that in the absence of a relevant
functional55 or biological difference, only a compelling state interest,
and not simply an important one,s' could justify the unequal treatment of men and women, provided that the regulatory means were
sufficiently narrowly tailored to that end. 7
a federal benefits program that awarded earnings of a deceased husband to his uidow but paid
out benefits only if the husband was receiving one-half of his support from his deceased wife).
See also, BVerfGE 87,234 (258); BVerfGE 92, 91 (109).
See BVerfGE 85, 191 (206).
49 See id.
See, eg., BVerfGE 75,40 (69-70); see also CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7. at 329.
51See BVerfGE 85, 191 (206). On this change, see JARASS & PiEROml, supra note 16, at 12122; but see, Heun, supranote 12, at 280 (RZ 94).
52 See Rokster v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (concuding that "Congress
acted well
within its constitutional authority when it authorized the registration of men, and not women,
under the Iilitary Selective Service Act). In comparison, the German Court has underscored
that alleged "real" differences are only acceptable when they are formulated uith reference to
biological and functional characteristics. See, eg., BVerfGE 10, 59 (74); B'erfge 71,224 (229).
See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, (1981) (sustaining the California statutory rape law that punished the male and not the female on the grounds that equal
protection does not require things that women as a group, unlike men, "are not eligible for
combat").
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1975) (noting that to iithstand constitutional challenge.
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives). See Currie, LotanerAbmad, supra note 17 (noting that a "compelling" reason is required to justify sex discrimination); Galotto, supra note 17
(detailing the development of intermediate scrutiny). For a more detailed anal)sis, see Hartwin
Bungert, Cldcherechigungvon Mann und Frauim amei;zanisceinund ira detislen Vrfassungrrecht,
89 ZErrscHRiFr FORVERGLEUCHENDE REcHTsWLsENscHAFr 441-465 (1990).
"' On the problems resulting from the resort to "functional differences," which are likely to
engender traditional stereotypes, see Currie, Lochner Abroad, supra note 17, at 365 and Heun,
supra note 12, at 283 (RZ 99).
The idea is that such a compelling interest, such as protecting the pregnant or regulating
birth, can only be pursued by making a gender-specific distinction. See Heun, supra note 12, at
282.
57 Since the purpose for the gender-specific differentiation must be narrowly tailored, it follows that it may concern problems arising "by their very nature" only with respect to women or
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In a case before it, the German Court conceded that banning employees from working during the night would promote the end of
protecting employee health; the means chosen, however, exempted
men, and due to that underinclusive "fit," the statute, the Court held,
had a discriminatory impact on women. 8 Moreover, the additional
arbitrary purpose of preventing women from bearing the double
burden of working during the night and taking care of children during the day, was sought by an inappropriate means, since this additional burden would also fall on men who were raising children. 9 It
should be noted that this is not the only case in which the Court's arguments focused on whether the means chosen by the legislature
were rationally related (geeignet) and, in light of less burdensome alternatives, necessary (erforderlich) in order to advance the policy in
question. 60 This article will return later to the conundrum in which
the rationalrelationship requirement, in addition to the requirement
of necessity of the means used toward the attainment of the end, represent two components of the proportionality principle (Grundsatz der
Verhdltnismdfligkeit) employed by the German Court.6 ' However, the
third component of the proportionality principle, the requirement of
proportionality in a narrow sense, which would apparently require balancing6 2 the weight of the governmental interest against the constitutional standard on non-discrimination, 6 was conspicuous by its absence in the case reviewing the law banning women from working at
nighti' Unlike a decision by the Austrian Constitutional Court,
men. See BVerfGE 92, 91 (109). It must be noted, however, that equality may need to yield to
other constitutional principles, such as the restriction of compulsory military service to men.
See THE BASIc LAW, supra note 34, art. 12a(1), at 18 ("Men who have attained the age of eighteen years may be required to serve in the Armed Forced, the Federal Border Guard, or in a civil
defence organization.").
58 See BVerfGE 85, 191 (208); cf. BVerfGE 92, 91 (109-11) (invalidating a statute in
which the
dutZ of serving as a fire-worker was only imposed on men).
See BVerfGE 85, 191 (208-209).
60 See generaly, Gubelt, supra note 16,
at 240.
61 The proportionality principle plays a prominent role in German
constitutional rights jurisprudence, but is generally unknown in American constitutional law. Those who have "discovered" this principle in American constitutional law have either come from a Germanic background or are familiar with German constitutional scholarship. See generally, Richard E. Levy,
EscapingLochner's Shadow: Toward a CoherentJurisprudenceof Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329,
422-24 (1995) (discussing that the Court's scrutiny of provisions to ensure that the proposed
law meets with requirements of due process is essentially a proportionately principle analysis);
CURRIE, THE CONSTrTUTION, supranote 7, at 340; Currie, Lochner Abroad, supra note 17, at 354,
361; WINFRIED BRUGGER, GRUNDRECHTE UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DEN
VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AmERinA 40-43 (Tfibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987). For an implicit acknowledgment, seeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW
105-06 (1980).
62 For an account of balancing in the domain of constitutionally protected
liberties (Freiheitsrechte), see Rudolf Wendt, Der Garantiegehaltder Grundrechteund das UbermafJverbot. Zur maflstabsetzenden Kraft der Grundrechtein der Ubermaflpriifung in 104 ARCHIV DES 6FFENTUCHEN REcHTS 414,
448-74 (1979).
63 For such a model, see Huster, Gleichheit und VerheltnismdfJigkeit,supra
note 33, at 544-46.
Scholars do not for the most part question whether a full test of proportionality is indeed
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which upheld a similar over- and under-inclusive statute on the
ground that under present conditions, the objective of protecting
working-class women carried more weight than the desire to treat
them like men,rs the German Court perfomed no such balancing. Instead, the German Court merely scrutinized whether the statute established a "tight fit" between a compelling interest and the means
utilized to satisfy it. Finding that the relationship was too loose, the
German Court struck down the statute.'
V.

ALWAYS AND ALREADYAMERICAN: THE ARBITRARIN.SS

STANDARD
Aside from the strict scrutiny test applied in cases pertaining to
Article 3(3),67 it seemed for a long time as if the general Equal Protection Clause found in Article 39(1) would, for reasons of udicial restraint, support nothing other than a rational basis test. The rational basis test was first introduced by the German Court under the
tenet of constitutionally safeguarding against legislative "arbitrariness."6 The German Court's first decision in 1951 established what
later came to be known as "the arbitrariness standard" (Willk1irverbot).
The standard provides that the Equal Protection Clause is violated if a
sound reason-a reason that reflects the nature of things or is otherwise substantially plausible-in favor of a legislative differentiation
cannot be discovered. In short, the Equal Protection Clause is violated if the provision must be regarded as arbitrary."
Before turning to a discussion of the arbitrariness standard, it is
important to note that the American doctrine of Equal Protection, as

articulated. Sometimes, it is simply held that there be a "proportional relationship' between the
goal and the criterion of differentiation. See, eg., Gubelt supra note 16, at 240; Stein, supra note
32, at 328-29. Huster alone has consistently examined what is really going on behind the veil of
formulae. SeeHuster, Cleichheitund Ve hdlinismdfiighcit,supra note 33, at 543-44.
65 SeeVfSlg. 13038/1992 and the prior decision in VfSlg. 11774/1988.
This strategy of avoiding the delicate issue of directly pitting the governmental purpose
against some standard of non-discrimination, as examined in Gunther, In Sarh ofEroltingDectrine, supranote 26, at 22-23, might even be present in the "painstaking" review deployed byjustice O'Connor in City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Although putting enormous strain on the prior discrimination requirement, Justice O'Connor never attacked
affirmative action as an exception to equal treatment, however passionately she may have scrutinized the means giving it effect. It should be noted, however, that the principle implicit in

Wgant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), that remedial action may be taken in response to past discrimination by the state, provided such action does not impose too heavy a
burden on innocent victims, is in the course ofJustice O'Connor's argument transformed into
a principle of retribution, under which the extent of past discrimination determines the remedial measure to be taken.
67 For the same conclusion, see Hesse, Der Geichheitssat, supra note 10. at 184.
rs See id. at 197; Hesse, Deragemeine Glddcuetssatz-supra note 16. at 127.
69 For an historical account, see Hesse, Der Gleichhdeitssatz supranote 10, at 178,
186. HLUSTY
REc-m UND ZIELE, supranote 33, at 45-48.
70 See52 BVerfGE 1, 14 (52).
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developed at the turn of this century,7' had some impact on its gestation. The arbitrariness standard originally appeared in writings of
the constitutional scholar Gerhard Leibholz, 7 first published during
the period of the Weimar Republic. Although his ideas gave rise to a
heated debate among constitutional scholars, they had no impact on
the practice of the State Court (Staatsgerichtshoj), which refused to
submit acts of the legislature to judicial scrutiny on Equal Protection
grounds. After the Second World War, however, Leibholz himself
was appointed to the German Court, and there can be no doubt that
his early scholarship left a discernable imprint on the judicial practice
of the 1950s. In fact, it seems almost as if the German Court had
simply transferred his early interpretation of Art. 109(1) of the Weimar Reichsverfassungto Article 3(1) of the new Basic Law. 7" Leibholz's
seminal conception was influenced to some degree by comparative
studies of the relevant Swiss and American doctrines.7 Thus, it appears, at least in retrospect, that the Americanization of German
equal protection review preceded the enactment of the Basic Law.
Leibholz's account of general equal protection rests on the distinction between "inaccurate" and "arbitrary" legislation." A statute is
"inaccurately" drafted if the resulting unequal or equal treatment of
persons or states of affairs is over- or underinclusive. Mere inaccuracy, as Leibholz explains, is not violative of equal protection; it
amounts to nothing more than a question of legal policy. 76 Under
certain conditions, however, a classification or distinction must be regarded as arbitrary, meaning that the statutory provision is unconstitutional and void. According to Leibholz, some of the instances in
which a statutory classification is unmistakably arbitrary may have a
familiar ring to Americans.77 A statute is arbitrary if: (1) no sound
reason can be discovered in support of the classification; (2) the relevant state of affairs is incompatible with the legal consequence attached to it; or (3) there is no "internal relationship" between the
unequal treatment and the goal pursued by the legislature or if that
relationship is too tenuous as to warrant a rational relationship of
71

For an articulation of the rational basis test, see Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220

U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). "One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." Id. (citations omitted). See also, F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (explaining that
a classification must not be arbitrary and must be based on a difference having a "fair and substantial relationship" to a legislative objective).
72 See GERHARD LEIBHOLZ,
DIE GLEICHHEIT VOR DEM GESETz: EINE STUDIE AUF
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER
UND
RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER GRUNDLAGE
(1959)
[herinafter
LEIBHOLZ, DIE GLEICHHEIT VOR DEM GESETZ]. For the influence of Heinrich Triepel's ideas, see
Hesse, Der Gleichheitssatz, supranote 10, at 178, 186.
73 SeeTHE BASIC LAW, supra note 34, at 14 ("All persons shall be equal
before the law.").
74 See LEIBHOLZ, DIE GLEICHHEIT VOR DEM GESETZ, supranote
72, at 36-38, 79-81.
75 See id. at 75.
76 See id.
n Seeid.
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means and ends.78 The similarity of this arbitrariness test to the
American rationality review is fairly obvious."
VI. A COMMON THEME: MERE RATIONALITY

To be sure, in the hands of the German Court, the arbitrariness
standard has taken on a life of its own. Although influential, Leibholz's text did not acquire a canonical form. The narrow focus on
arbitrariness, however, has in effect likened the arbitrariness principle to rational basis review. A reading of the arbitrariness standard as
based on American rational basis review is supported by a considerable string of precedents to be found in the practice of the German
Court.80
Above all, one may construe the rational basis requirement and
the arbitrariness standard in such a way so as to define the ultimate
limits of the legislature's freedom to sort out relevant characteristics
of persons8' in its pursuit of some constitutionally-permissible goal. "
This interpretive option is endorsed by those German constitutional
scholars who contend that the German Court is not authorized to interfere with legislative value choices based on arbitrary considerations
ofjustice.s According to this view, the legislature faces few obstandes
in furthering legitimate purposes via statutes based on some rational
criterion of unequal treatment." Inasmuch as the use of certain criteria (such as race or gender) is not proscribed by the German Constitution itself," they argue, the only limitation afforded by general
equal protection doctrine consists of the appropriate, though loose,
fit between such a criterion, the classificatory means, and the permissible goal. 6 The fact that these same authors sometimes look for
See id.
For a discussion of how this type of review operates in the context of several clauses of the
Constitution, see Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1695-98 (discussing the baseline requirement prohibiting naked preferences). See also Robert W. Bennett, '"tre"Rationahty in ConsttutionalLaw.
Judicial Review and Democratic Thneo, 67 CAL L REV. 1049 (1979) (discussing the limits of legitimate legislative purposes).
so See Heun, supra note 12, at 247 (RZ 29). Accordingly, any unequal treatment has been
supported by "the nature of things" or some other plausible reason. Se BverfGE 1. 4 (52); 61.
138 (147); 89, 132 (141); 81, 1 (23).
8 These characteristics include the "role" according to which human beings are treated differently. See, eg., Gusy, supranote 32, at 2506; Stein, supra note 32 at 320.
Sep, eg., BVerfGE 9, 201 (206).
SeeStein, supranote 32, at 322; Gusy, supranote 32, at 2506.
SeeStein, supranote 32, at 327-29.
'5 See Gusy, supra note 32, at 2507-08; see also, Gubelt, supra note 16, at 235-37 (emphasizing
that according to this approach the rational basis test can identify three legislative failures; the
choice of a constitutionally impermissible goal, the use of an impermissible criterion, and the
inappropriateness of the means with respect to the purpose). For an earlier account. see
.RFAss..*\GsRECHTU1CHEN
ADALBERT PODLECH, GEHALT UND FUNKTION DES ALLGEMELNEN
GLEICHHErrSSATZES 110-117 (1971).
See Wolfgang Rfifaer, Art. 3 § 1, in 1 BONNER KOMMENTAR ZLM GRUNDGESETZ 26-27 (RZ
31) (Dolzner & Vogel, eds., Heidelberg: C.F. Mfller, 73rd ed. 1995); Kirchhof, supranote 32, at
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guidance from such ambiguous concepts as "the basic values of the
Constitution,"87 eventually likens this restrictive reading of equal protections to the broader approach taken in the German Court's decisions.s9
Nevertheless, such a perspective on equal protection can find
support in jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic. Accordingly,
the boundary drawn by general equal protection is marked by what is
"evidently" arbitrary," or, to use the terms of the United States
Supreme Court in Mathews v. DeCastro,9' by what is "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment." 2 Put in positive terms, legislation will be upheld if one can reasonably conceive of
a set of facts which constitute a distinction" and the fit between
means and ends is "at least debatable" 94 or can conceivably be supported by one sound reason, regardless of the quality of that reason.
Both the German Court and the United States Supreme Court announced that the question of control over whether the legislation has
settled on the most rational and just solution is not of their concern.9
Accordingly, just as the German Court has been criticized for relaxing the arbitrariness standard,9 7 likewise, in the United States, rational
basis review" has been attacked for lacking the appropriate "bite."'
845 (RZ 34); Stein, supranote 32, at 323-24; Gusy, supra note 32, at 2508.
87 See Gubelt, supra note 16, at 239; Stein,
supra note 32, at 327-28.
88 For a thoroughly deferential approach, see Gusy,
supra note 32, at 2507-08.
89 See infra, section
IX.
90 See BVerfGE 12, 326 (333); BVerfGE 17, 318 (330); BVerfGE 18, 121 (124);
BVerfGE 23,
50, (60); BVerfGE 50, 177 (191); BVerfGE 52, 277 (281). For an account, see Dfirig, supra note
41, at 238-45 (RZ 275-284).
91 See429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976).
9

Id.
9s SeeAllied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1980).

See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) ("Here the discrimination against residents is not invidious... because... it rests... upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or differenc in state policy, which the state
is not prohibited from... classifying." (referring to United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 15-54 (1938))).
95 See, e.g., BVerfGE 17, 122 (130); BVerfGE 33, 44 (51). For further references,
see
Kirchhof, supra note 32, at 943-44 (RZ 236).
96 See, e.g., United States tR.R Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (explaining
in dictum that, in cases involving social and economic benefits, the Court has consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds legislation that is deemed unwise or inartfully
drawn); NewYork City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); BVerfGE 17, 311 (330);
BVerfGE 33, 44, (52); BVerfGE 50, 177 (191); BVerfGE 53, 313 (330).
97 See HUSTER, RECHTE UND ZIELE, supranote
33, at 51-53.
98 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961). For a more recent
case, see
Nordlingerv. Hahn, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2329 (1992) explaining that the "Equal Protection Clause
does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification."
99 See LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1445-1446
(2d ed. 1988) (criticizing the Court's reluctance to explicitly recognize new categories of classifications and discussing the danger of leaving them to be determined by rational basis review). For a political criticism of German
practice, see DIETER-DIRK HARTMANN,
WVILLKORVERBOT
UND
GLEICHHEITSGEBOT 41-43 (1972); see also, Hans-Peter Schneider, Eigenart und Funktionen der
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In the
United States, notable exceptions, however, include Reed v.
Reead° and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward.'"' As Cass Sunstein
observed:
It merely requires something other than raw political power
to justify an exercise of authority. In most respects, this is a
trivial constraint, for almost any decision can be justified by
reference to some public value. One might, for example,
support preferential treatment of the poor on the ground
that they have a special need for public assistance; preferential treatment of the rich might be justified on the ground
that it provides incentives for more work and investment...
• Everything, in short, is at least potentially lawul.i '
n practice, however, subject matter also impacts whether or not a
low level of scrutiny is applied.0 Generally, courts are more reluctant
to examine legislative decisions in areas involving economic0 policy,
public spending, and budgetary planning than in other areas.
Nonetheless, considering the vast array of subject matters open to
equal protection examination, it is quite reasonable to demand that
the arbitrariness standard and rational basis review be raised to some
Grundredzte im demokratisdien Verfassungssaa in GRUND.RECHTE ALS FLNDAME.%tr DER
DFoxrms
11, 23 (J. Perels, ed., Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979).
10 See 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding a probate provision giving preference
to men over women
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
101See 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that an Alabama statute imposing substantially lower
taxes on in-state insurance companies than on out-of-state insurance companies iolated the
Equal Protection Clause).
a2 Sunstein, supm note 42, at 1698.
103 See genera!y, Heim, supra note 12, at 247 (RZ 29); BVerfGE
88. 87 (96); BVerfGE 91, 346
(363).
104 See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (applying rational
basis scrutiny to legislative
decisions to increase property taxes and noting the presumption of constitutionality of such
decisions); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 885 (1985) (O'Connor.J., dissenting); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (notvitlstanding classsiiications created by legislative decision to change eligibility criteria for pension benefits, the decision only triggers low level scrutiny); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); BVerfGE 11,
50, at 60; BVerfGE 18, 315, (331); BVerfGE 29, 402, (411); BVerfGE 60. 16, (42.43); BVerfGE
61, 43, (63); Rfifner, supra note 86, at 109 (RZ 198); KoNRAD HESSE, GRLtNDZ2CCE DES
VERFAStSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDEsREPUBLUK DELrrSCHLAND 190, n. 89 (RZ 439) (Heidelberg.
Mfiller Ver., 20th ed. 1995) [hereinafter Hesse, GRUNDZ'GE DES VERFASS.NGSRECiT$]; ste also,
Gubelt, supra note 16, at 237-38; BRUGGER, supranote 61, at 16--71. As the Supreme Court has
recently affirmed in FCCv. Beadh CommunicalionsInc, 113 S.Ct. 2096,2101-2 (1993):
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification .... [V]e never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.
Currie, however, correctly observes that in the area of taxation and welfare benefits judicial review by the German Court is far less moderate than it is by the Supreme Court. See Currie,
LochnerAbroad, supra note 17, at 369. Apart from the protection of the family afforded by Article 6, Article 3 § 1 of the Basic Law also ensures the most important basic rights for the control
of legislation in the area of taxation. Se also Heun, supra note 12, at 265 (RZ 65).
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higher level of scrutiny as well. In light of the general elusiveness of
means-ends relationships, the bite of equal protection may be reinforced by introducing what Justice Stevens has described as the "requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends
the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class."'0 5 A collapse
into a more or less outspoken balancing1°6 is one of two conceivable
paths of which a more resolute enforcement of the arbitrariness
standard might conceivably take, and, indeed, has taken, at least in
the Federal Republic of Germany. 17 The other conceivable path introduces substantive justice as one of the components of the meansends test. The first path, as adapted in Germany, assesses the overall
appropriateness of legislation, despite the fact that the Court cannot
officially resort to superlegislating, whereas the second path represents a preferred version of the resolute arbitrariness standard.'
VII. THE CLOSET RESOLUTE ARBITRARINESS STANDARD:
BALANCING

One can readily observe balancing at an early stage in the life of
the arbitrariness standard,' °9 although the German Court has not followed this course of decision making consistently. For example, in
1964, the German Court reviewed a statute that deprived tenants of
the usual protection against a landlord's capricious lease terminations in situations where the tenants' building was devoted for such
"public purposes" as supplying a workplace for public officials. The
German Court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protec105City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). For a reconstruction of the conception of deliberation at the bottom of modern representative systems, see Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
49-55 (1982).
10 See generally, TRIBE, supra note 99, at 1444-45 (explaining that the majority in Plyler
v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982), "treated the rationality standard as a balancing test of sorts"). For an interesting account of the fundamental rights branch of American equal protection review, see
Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution:A Note on the RelationshipBetween Due Process
and EqualProtection,55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1168-69 (1982). Sunstein argued:
The 'fundamental rights' branch of Equal Protection is self-consciously designed to prohibit states from drawing impermissible lines with respect to
rights that the Due Process Clause does not substantively protect. For example, discrimination with respect to the right to vote and the right to appeal is prohibited, even though the states may eliminate both rights. Similarly, the Court has barred distinctions affecting the right to marry and the
right to procreate while assuming that those rights are substantively unprotected by the Due Process Clause.
Id.
107

See infra section VII.

108 See infra section VIII.
109 See BVerfGE 9, 20 (31) (establishing the relevant standard after
an assessment of the con-

sequences); BverGE 50, 177 (191). On striking the right balance between administrative convenience and the burden imposed, see BVerfGE 29, 402 (411); Heun, supra note 12, at 248.
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tion Clause of Article 3, § 1.1 The argument supporting the statute
stated simply that the public interest must be balanced against the
tenants' interest in remaining in their residences. When government
officials need office space, the Court held, the public interest will
prevail.'
In crafting this argument, the Court looked to civil law,
which provided that landlords could recover rented apartments for
their own residential use."2 Interestingly, the Court reasoned that
landlords and the state, as the owners of public buildings, ith respect to the civil law standard of "own residential use," were analogous. Hence, the situation involving tenants who were adversely affected by a landlord's decision to terminate their leases was to be
regarded in the same manner.113
While the comparison made in this case was elusively and
unsoundly argued, it demonstrates how the factors the German Court
purports to determine as relevant criteria of equal treatment indeed
can be forged from balancing, or by engaging in review of "proportionality in a narrow sense." Instead of reasoning in the manner it
did, the Court first should have introduced a general criterion which
grants landlords a right"14 to recover premises for their own residential use. The Court then should have asked the question whether the
circumstances of private landlords and the state can reasonably be
compared. Yet in this case, the facile appeal to equality, although initially based on an appealing desire to balance public gains and private burdens, obscured a manifest difference in the interests affected."5 Substantively, the Court never asked the critical question of
whether public and private landlords are truly analogous. Instead,
the Court merely assumed that such a criterion of equal treatment
existed. In doing so, the Court failed to recognize that the criterion
itself was constructed from the process of balancing the state interest
against the burden imposed on tenants.
There is a reason why some judicial arguments that begin by following the "balancing path" occasionally end up by following the second, or "adoption of a criterion of substantive justice" path. The
long dominant idea that equality, in contrast to basic liberties, is devoid of a yielding baseline" 6 reflects this shift in analytical transition.
Against this background, a judicial approach to equal protection,
which balances the benefits of government action against the burdens imposed by such action seems out of place. Therefore, prior to
the emergence of the New Formula, precedents such as the case dis-

110BVerfGE 18, 121 (124).
See id. at 124-25.
112 SeeU
1 SeeS .
"'

,,4 SeePeter Westen, TheEmpty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARv. L REv. 537.55658. 565 (19S2).
1 See id at 585-86 (making a similar observation).
116 See id. at 562-64.
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cussed," 7 if the balancing test had been detected at all, were likely to
be discounted as mere aberrations." 8 The following section seeks to
explain why this perception would have prevailed.
VIII.

THE RECEIVED DISTINCTION BETWEEN BASIC LIBERTIES AND
EQUAL PROTECTION

According to well-established German, as well as American' 9 constitutional doctrine, almost all rights and liberties-the noteworthy
exception being "human dignity" in Article 1 of the German Basic
Law' 0-may lawfully be infringed or compromised by the legislature
if the legislative action is based on a legitimate government interest.
Even basic rights, therefore, are not absolute. As discussed above,
however, in order to survive judicial review, the legislative infringement of such rights must satisfy the proportionality principle. The
third component of this principle, "proportionality in a narrow
sense," is generally understood as requiring the Court to balance the
weight of the governmental interest against the interests protected by
the constitutional right. 2' Basic constitutional rights, according to
the third component of the proportionality principle, avail over a
specific "scope of protection" (Schutzbereich). A determination of the
right's "scope of protection" with respect to a particular individual is
arrived at by evaluating the individual's interest in the state of affairs
in question or by evaluating the individual's opportunity to engage in
certain forms of conduct.12 As it is understood, the scope of protection is susceptible to a description that refers to some prototype of
human activity or makes reference to some state of affairs or legal institutions protected by the'right. 123 In the process of balancing, the
scope of protection afforded an individual's basic right may ultimately need to surrender to the opposing governmental interest.
Provided that the governmental interest is pursued by rational means,
the scope of protection for an individual's basic right is taken to de-

117

SeeBverfGE 18, 121 (124).

118 See CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION,

supranote 7, at 335. According to Currie, however, there

is a long-standing tradition of exercising strict scrutiny in the area of taxation. Moreover, statutes were struck down on the ground of the severity of impact. See id. at 333-34. Currie overlooks, however, the fact that the appearance of strict scrutiny is owed to the means-scrutiny exercised in the application of criteria ofjustice, such as the principle of "ability to pay" (Leistungsfdhigkeitsprinzip). See Heun, supra note 12, at 266.
See, e.g., Levy, supra note 61, at 422-24; Ira C. Lupu, Untanglingthe Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1012, 1061-63 (1979).
120 See PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supranote 11, at 83.
121 SeeWendt, supra note 62, at 448-74.
1n

See id. at 436-38.

125

See Peter Lerche, GrundrechtlicherSchutzbereich, Grundrechtsprdgungund Grundrechtsschranke,

in 5 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 739, 748-50
& Paul Kirchhof, eds., Heidelberg: C.F. Miller 1992).

(J. Isensee
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fine the "yielding baseline" of the right)2 ' Accordingly, in the sphere
of rights and liberties, the "yielding" and the "definite" baseline
(Schutzbereich and aktueller Garantiebereich) may legitimately differ.'2 3
The "definite" baseline of the right is determined through the application of the principle of proportionality.-f The protection of rights
and liberties does not presuppose any comparisons between persons
and groups, since with respect to the yielding baseline one can ascertain whether the government has infringed upon, or indeed violated,
a right. Within this context of yielding and definite baselines, proportionality in a narrow sense-proportionality proper--demands
that any adverse impact of a leislative action be proportional to the
beneficial ends of that action."
Against this conceptual background, the perceived distinction between rights and liberties on the one hand, and equality on the other,
amounts to the following:? Regardless of the interests, activities or
state of affairs adversely affected, equality is relevant to all kinds of
governmental activity. Hence, equal protection analysis differs from
the basic tripartite structure of right, burden, and proportionality.'29
First, unlike other basic rights and liberties, the right to equality
does not have a scope of protection that would lend itself to a description of a naturally given or legally constituted state of affairs or
some prototype of human activity!' The right to equality at its core
is a claim to be treated equally whenever the government implements
certain classifying criteria in the pursuit of legislative goals."' Equality demands that certain government behavior be determined with
respect to how that government entity acts in relation to others. ' -"
The right to equal treatment, therefore, can only be specified in the
general context of governmental action (or inaction).'
Second, one cannot plausibly say that the right to be treated alike
or unalike is the same as being burdened. Since, unlike other basic
rights and liberties, the right to be treated equally has no pre124 See Bernhard Schlink, Frlazit durdt Eingiffsabuehr -

Rdonstr lion der Pdasmnshen Gnn-

dredtfurnktim, 11 EUROPISCHE GRUNDREcHTEzErscHRIFr 457,460-62 (1984).

125 See GERTRUDE LOBBE-OLFF, DIE GRUNDREcHTE ALS EINGRIFI&%B%%'iHRREHTE 29-30 (Ba-

den-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1988).
126 Sid.

1 SeeWendt, supranote 62, at 460; EKKEHART STEIN, STATSRECHT 242-3 (Tfibingen: Mohr,
14th ed. 1993) [hereinafter STEIN, STAATSRECHT].
12 See, eg., Heun, supranote 12,239 (RZ 15).
129SeeKirchhof, supranote 32, at 911-12.
IS See R~fner, supranote 86, at 85-86 (RZ 66. 148). A similar observation can be found in
Kenneth L Karst, EqualCitizenship Under the FourkenthAinendment,91 HARv. L RE%,. 1,39 (1977)
("The problem of limits is inescapable in any effort to deal with a prindple of equality.).
151 See Rfifner, supra note 86, at 57 (RZ 96).
2s- See PIEROTH & SCHLIUNK, supra note 11, at 112-14;JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 16, at 9697; LOBBE-WOLFF, supra note 125, at 236-46.
122 See Hen, supra note 12, at 244 (RZ 25); Kirchhof, supra note 32, at 912 (RZ 164);
MICHAEL CH. JAKOBS, DER GRUNDSATZ DER VETHAL
smfAiGKEIT. MIT ELNER EX,-PLPiSCHEN
DARSTELLUNG SEINER GELTUNG IM ATOMREcHT 40 (Carl He)mianns Verlag KG 1985).
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determined scope of protection against governmental action, an immediate clash of this right and the public interest cannot occur. In
the absence of any conflict, there is nothing to be resolved by a balancing process. Given that the right of equal treatment has no scope
of protection against governmental action that would easily lend itself
to description, this right amounts to an assertion that the government
should not fall short in meeting certain criteria of substantive justice.M By accounting for certain criteria of substantive justice, rules
may be introduced for the comparison of persons and states of affairs
by highlighting relevant qualities of each person or state of affairs.
Normative principles then may establish whether it is just to treat particular persons differently, even though in other contexts such persons might be deserving of equal treatment.3 1 If criteria of substantive justice are applied consistently, persons are given "their due,"
and treated alike or unalike according to the normative principles
that govern what they "deserve." 36 Accordingly, the right to equal
treatment, which "by its very nature" is not susceptible to balancing,
has inherent limitations. 37 Equality has no yielding baseline, but there
is always a pre-established definite baseline that is defined by various
criteria of substantive justice.3
Given this doctrinal context, it is clear that balancing could not
provide a framework for a more resolute application of arbitrariness
standards. Conversely, submitting legislation to criteria of substantive
justice, such as the "ability to pay" in matters of taxation,' 39 offers a
means for devising a truly resolute arbitrariness standard. It is the
reference to criteria of substantive justice that marks the second path
of the resolute arbitrariness standard, which will be examined in the
next section.
IX.THE PREFERRED RESOLUTE ARBITRARINESS STANDARD: THE
NATURE OF THINGS AND ITS SUBSTITUTE (SYSTEMATIC
CONSISTENCY)

134See,

e.g.,

PETER LERCHE,

UBERMASS

UND

VERFASSUNGSRECHT:

ZUR BINDUNG

DES

GESETZGEBERS AN DIE GRUNDSATZE DER VERHALTNISMABIGKEIT UND DER ERFORDERLICHHEIT 29-

31 (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1961); LOBBE-WOLFF, supra note 125, at 258-60;
Kirchhof, supranote 32, at 911 (RZ 161-162).
135 See Westen, supra note 114, at 548-40 ("To say that two
people are 'equal' and entitled to
be treated 'equally' is to say that they both fully satisfy the criteria of a governing rule of treatment.").

See id at 557 (reducingjustice to a statement, and equality to a statement ofjustice).
This view is widely held in German constitutional doctrine. See e.g., HUSTER, RECHTE UND
ZIELE, supranote 33, at 226-42. The basic import of the German conclusion, namely the lack of
a yielding baseline on the part of equality, is often confounded with its modal indifference. For
a clarification, see LOBBE-WOLFF, supra note 125, at 244-45. The latter ("modal indifference")
means that even though government may he at liberty to impose burdens or to distribute benefits, it still must comply with the additional constraint set by criteria ofjustice. See id.
13 See LOBBE-WOLFF, supra note 125,
at 18.
139SeeHeun, supra note 12, at 266 (RZ 66).
16

137
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As an alternative to the first path, which entails an absolute balancing of the governmental interests against the individual rights at
stake, the second path leading to a more resolute arbitrariness test
involves the implicit identification of a substantive criterion ofjustice
within the context of either the means or the ends components of
governmental action. To refine this point, one might say, moreover,
that resorting to means rather than ends focused analysis represents a
distinct characteristic of the arbitrariness standard. If the second
path is assumed, judicial inquiry focuses on whether differential or
equal treatment caused by legislative action conforms to a criterion
of justice,'4'rather than, as required in absolute balancing, focusing
on whether governmental treatment imposes an excessive burden on
the individual. Judicial reasoning, thus, essentially becomes an examination of a classification, and the legal consequences attached to
that classification. The examination of the classification and its consequences is conducted against the background of a particular criterion of substantive justice, which is either alleged to have been established by the legislature itself or is understood to be an intrinsic
feature of the "peculiarities" of the social situation subject to regulation.1' Judicial reasoning which recognizes the latter amounts essentially to an appeal to the nature of things. Judicial reasoning which
recognizes the former, in contrast, seems to display a more deferential attitude toward the legislature.'
By assuming the second path, the German Court developed a
double standard that reintroduced the arbitrariness standard into its
own doctrine. In a well-known line of cases, the German Court has
held that the legislature may select the differences relevant to unequal treatment,' provided that it not ignore a similarity of social
situations and positions so significant that the similarity must be
taken into account from the "standpoint ofjustice.""* In practice, in
most cases it is imprudent for judges16 to assert that the legislature
has overlooked a similarity of social situations, even when the quasinatural normative force of the similarity is "evidently" rooted in the
4

SeeBVerfGE 4, 144, (155); BVerfGE86, 81, (87); Heun. supra note 12, at239-240 (RZ 17)

141Therefore, this conformity-test is to be distinguished from assessing proportionality in a

narrowsense. SeeHUSTER, RECHnT UND ZIELE, supra note 33. at 170-71.
1 See BVerfGE 17, 122, (130); see also, See Kirchhof, supra note 32, at 929-37 (RZ 205-21). It
comes as no surprise to learn that this approach has been criticized as being too actiist. See
HusrER, REcHTE UND ZIELE, supra note 33, at 386-88; Hesse, Der Glkidzl itssat, supra note 10. at
188 n. 52.
1 See HusTE, REcHTE UND ZELE, supra note 33, at 390-92.
144 See, eg., BVerfGE 25,371 (400); BVerfGE 35,263 (272).
1 See e.g., BVerfGE 48, 346 (357); BVerfGE 53, 313 (329-30); BVcrfGE 55. 11 (25-26). This

principle was originally established by BVerfGE 1,264 (276). This article will resume an examination of "significance" and the "standpoint ofjustice" as components of the arbitrariness standard below. See infra section XL
146For an example of a brave resort to social reciprocities, see BVerfGE 75, 108 (25-26).
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"peculiarities of the regulated subject matter."4 7 As a consequence,
as we have seen, the German Court has emphasized that the legislature has broad discretion when selecting the standard of equal or
unequal treatment. 48 Despite the practical limitations on the power
of the Court to assert that the legislature has overlooked a similarity
of social situations, it may, nevertheless, require the legislature to adhere to the principles of its own regulation.
For example, the German Court upheld a statutory provision allowing dependents of an insured to receive only sixt percent of retirement benefits after the insured has passed away.'9 The German
Court found that this system of retirement benefits rested on two
principles: (1) the principle of insurance; and (2) the principle of
care (Fiirsorge). The German Court reasoned that the legislature
complied with the principle of insurance when it provided for payment of one hundred percent of retirement benefits to the insured
during his or her life. The Court also reasoned that the legislature
complied with the principle of care when it provided that the dependents of an insured deceased were entitled to receive only sixty
percent of the insured's benefits.'" ° Although one might suspect that
this reasoning arose from the "peculiarities of the situation" approach,'5' the German Court observed, rather, that if the legislature
had based the differential treatment on the principle of need, it
would have seriously questioned the validity of the statutory provision. '512 The Court found that the legislature did not adopt the principle of need with respect to this statutory provision and upheld the
statute because it complied with the two principles described above.' 3
The implied legislative power to establish criteria ofjustice can be
turned against the legislature itself. One may argue that legislation
must comply with the established system of principles within a specific area of the law.'5 This principle of systematic consistency,
termed Systemgerechtigkeit, played a prominent role in the Court's ju147See, e.g., BVerfGE 26, 72 (74); see also, Rfifner, supra note 86, at 25 (RZ 29);
Dfirig, supra
note 41, at 146 (RZ 310). For a striking example, according to which progressive taxation is required by the German Constitution, see BVerfGE 29, 402 (412); BVerfGE 32, 333 (339); BVerfGE 36,66 (72).
148 For example, the Court gave the legislature leeway to determine
the amount of alimony
paid to public officials, reasoning that no pre-established relationship would help to translate
differences of position and status into monetary terms. In short, there seem to have been no
"peculiarities of the subject matter" that would amount to a criterion ofjustice. See BVerfGE 26,
72 (78).
149 See BVerfGE 48, 346 (356).
150 See id, at 358-59.
1 On the different treatment of retirement benefits of
public officials and other employees
within the system of taxation on the grounds that the respective entitlements are different in
nature, see BVerfGE 55, 11 (26, 31).
152See BVerfGE 48 346 (356).
153 See id, at 356.
1 See, e.g., Gubelt, supra note 16, at 240-41; Gusy, supra note
32, at 2508; Dirig, supra note
41, at 87-100 (RZ 194-232); Rfifner, supra note 86,at 29-32 (RZ 39-40).
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risprudence for many years.'55 Apparently yielding to wide criticism, -5
the Court subsequently employed the arbitrariness standard to curtail
arguments based on systematic consistency 7 by holding that the legislature may deviate from the established system, so long as it does
not do so arbitrarily.lss The reintroduction'"9 of the arbitrariness
standard by this departure, however, is to some extent dependent on
the sphere of the government action in question."O
Before the second purported Americanization of German equal
protection review occurred, there were "suspect" classifications, the
use of which as a basis for a legislative distinction'.' was explicitly proscribed by Article 3 § 3. In addition, within the domain of general
equal protection furnished by Article 3 § 1, concealed balancing and
the use of equal treatment criteria existed as two ways of intensifying
review.6 2 What was still absent, however, was a general, as opposed to
particular, classification-based approach to strict scrutiny. This general classification-based approach is exactly what the New Formula
pretended to introduce.
X. THE NEW FORMU.A: CAROLENgEPRODUCTSABROAD?
In Germany, the special provisions of equal protection have always
been understood to be integral parts of an overarching principle. s
Thus, according to the German Court, the special provisions of
equality are simply detailed manifestations of the general Equal Pro15

See, eg., BVerfGE 9, 339 (349); BVerfGE 17, 122 (132).

eg., CHRISTOPH DEGENHART, SIMTMGERECHTIGKErT UND SELBSTBNDUNG
GESETZGEBERSALSVERFASSUNGSPOSTULAT 22-23, 27-28 (Munich: CH.Beck 1976).
156 See,

DES

See, e g., BVerfGE 25, 371 (402-403); BVerf"E 59, 36 (39).
See, ag., BVerfGE 34, 103 (115); BVerfGE 61, 138 (148); BVerfGE 66. 217 (224). For further examples, see Husr, RcHTE UND ZIELE, supra note 33, at 389; FIUz-JOSEPH PEiS'E.
SYST_ GERECHTIGKEIT 55-56 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgescllschaft 1985); Kirchhof. supra
note 32, at 942 (RZ 232-33); Heun, supranote 12, at 249-50 (RZ 34).
' On the significance of re-entries for the avoidance of paradoxes, see NIKLs LutLMA.,.N,
cHAFr 93-94 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1990).
DIE WISSENSCHAFr DER GES
157

For example, for purposes of reducing spending, the legislature has relatively broad discretion to rearrange welfare-benefits. See BVerfGE 60, 16 (43). For counter-examples, ho;wever,
see Currie, LochnerAbroad,supranote 17, at 369 ("Among other things, the Constitutional Court
has found fault with the exclusion of employment benefits for students and for persons formerly employed by their parents, limitations on aid of the blind or disabled, and the denial of
retirement benefits to persons living abroad.") (citations omitted).
161SeeHeun, supra note 12, at 287 (RZ 110).
' One might add that judicial scrutiny has been higher where an unequal treatment has
burdened the exercise of a basic liberty. This holds true, for example, with respect to the equal
opportunity to education. As Currie notes, in this respect, German equal protection doctrine
closely resembles the fundmental rights strand of equal protection in the United States. See
CURRiE, THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 333. A further elaboration of the fairly complex
body of precedents is beyond the scope of this essay. For a useful overview of the subject matter,
see Wmflied Rohloff, Zusammenwirken von allgemeinem Gleiclheitssatz und Freiheitsge%%-ahrleistumgen. Eine Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (1992)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University ofAugsburg).
See Heun, supranote 12, at 293 (RZ 126).
160
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tection Clause.'" It comes as no surprise, therefore, that, at least in
particular cases, one might assimilate the arbitrariness standard into
the stricter test of Article 3, § 3.
The step toward assimilating the arbitrariness standard into the
Article 3, § 3 test was apparently taken in 1980 with the promulgation
of a New Formula165 by the First Senate of the German Court.56 Although the Court's own characterization of the New Formula
sounded far more moderate,16 some commentators, insofar as the
New Formula introduced a general classification-based higher scrutiny test, posited that it represented a decisive break with the traditional standard.'68

The allegedly revolutionary New Formula' 69 appears in an opinion
of the German Court70 in the format of an explanation of some circumstances under which a statute should be invalidated on Article 3, § 1 equal protection grounds. With a bold emphasis on group
disadvantage reminiscent of the most famous footnote of American
constitutional law,' 71 the German Court first held that this Clause is
violated: In particular if a group of norm-addressees is treated differently from another group, although the differences between those
groups are not of such
a kind nor of such a weight as to justify the
2
unequal treatment.

Second, the Court declared that this "regulatory import" of Article 3, § 1 had been repeatedly emphasized in decisions dealing with
statutes that deviate from a pre-established system. 7 s The Court did
not indicate, however, whether the range of this "explication" of the
See, e.g., BVerfGE 25, 167 (173); BVerfGE 44, 1 (18); BVerfGE 48, 346 (365). See also,
e.g.,
BVerfGE 85, 191 (206) (holding that Art. 3 § 3 is to be understood as underscoring the general
Equal Protection Clause of§ 1).
On the significance of "formulae" in the context ofjudicial review, see generally Robert F.
Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 182 (1985) (asserting that formulae
stem from the effort to combine formalism and realism and to preserve the authority of the
text).
166 See BVerfGE 55, 72 (88).
167 See id. (insinuating that it wishes to clarify aspects
of its formerjurisprudence).
168 SeeGubelt, supranote 16, at (RZ 14); MAAB, supra note 16, at 14.
169Herzog raises the question of whether these decisions turned out differently then they
16

would have under the old arbitrariness standard. See Roman Herzog, Art. 3 Anhang Der allgemeine Gleichheitsgrundsatz (Art. 3 Abs. 1) in der Rechisprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in I
GRUNDGESETZ 357 (RZ 7) (Theodore Maunz et. al. eds., Munich: C.H. Beck, 7th ed. 1994).
170 See BVerfGE 55, 72 (88).
1 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 144 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... curtail(ing] the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."). In contrast to
footnote four of CaroteneProducts, however, the German Court did not establish any link between group disadvantage and the failure of the political process. This link, however, rests on
questionable grounds. See generally, Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1985) (arguing that the Carolene Products approach to minority rights "yields systematically misleading cues within the new participatory paradigm").
1 See BVerfGE 55, 72
(88).
173 See id.
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meaning of general equal protection should be restricted to the context in which it was discovered. 7 4
The development of the New Formula was disjointed and quite
confusing. For a considerable period of time, it was unclear whether
this formula was meant to replace the old arbitrariness standard."'
Although the First Senate announced that the New Formula represented the regular standard of review," 6 several subsequent decisions
still seem to rely on the traditional inventory.' As this article will
suggest, the integration of old and new formulae into something that
one might call the "Most Recent Formula" has attenuated this problem. Yet, even before the Court created its Most Recent Formula, the
Second Senate expressed reluctance to follow the course taken by the
First Senate. The result caused substantial uncertainty in the application of formulae. Although the Second Senate and the German
Court employed the New Formula in some instances, opinions of
each body exhibited a steadfast preference for the arbitrariness standard.178 In addition, the Second Senate opted for an approach to the
arbitrariness standard even more robust than that employed by the
German Court. Under the Second Senate's arbitrariness standard,
heightened scrutiny was made conditional on the peculiarities of the
legislation, reardiess of whether the unesocial situation subject to
distinct groups.
qual treatment affected
Despite the differences in the old and new formulae variously applied, there is widespread agreement among scholars that both approaches have to some extent incorporated the principle of proportionality into the German Court's equal protection review. 7 This
interpretation, "the official account," suggests that the complex principle of proportionality did not emerge until the German Court created the New Formula and the Second Senate synthesized its idiosyncratic method of analysis from a myriad of diverse precedents. The
official account also implies that the Court's formulaic discourse
about the weighing of differences undertaken in the implementation
of the proportionality principle can be taken at face value and,
hence, that judicial practice actually involves a strict test of the proportionality of the quasi-suspect differential treatment of groups.""
See id., at 90.
See Hesse, DerCldhheiat7,supranote 10, at 90-91.
176 See, e-g., BVerfGE 72,84 (89); BVerfGE 74, 129 (149).
in Accordingly, despite the New Formula, the legislature still has wide discretion in matters
7

1

of social security and the installment of public officials. Se4 eg., BVerfGE 68. 287 (301); BVerfGE 57, 107, (113). See also, MaaB, supranote 16, at 18.
178 See, eg., BVerfGE 67, 70 (85-86); BVerfGE 78, 249 (287); BVcrfGE 79, 223 (236). For an
overview, see Hesse, Deralgemne Gleichhedtssatz, supra note 16, at 125.26.
17' See, eg., BVerfGE 75, 108 (158).
tlssat, supya note 16, at 123. 126. For a critique of
IS See, eg., Hesse, Der ailgaenne Glic
Hesse's view see HusrER, RECHTE UND ZtELE. ZuR, supra note 33, at 193-194 and Heun. supra
note 12, at 246 (RZ 27-28).
181Justice Katzenstein expressed the latter idea in a dissenting opinion. See BVerfGE 74, 9.
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Before returning to this question, this article will briefly address why
the New Formula might just as well 8have
evolved, almost harmoni2
ously, from the arbitrariness standard.s
XLA NON-OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE NEW FORMULA'S PEDIGREE
Over the years, the arbitrariness standard has developed something akin to a scheme of equal protection review. This scheme consists of a sequence of propositions giving effect to the idea that equal
protection review must assemble a stable synthesis of considerations
of substance and institutional competence. Against this backdrop,
the New Formula can be read to specify certain elements of the sequence of considerations for an effective equal protection review.
Under the New Formula, the scheme begins with the blunt assertion that the legislature must not treat differently what is essentially
alike. This substantive overture is followed by considering institutional competence, which amounts to the understanding that, in
principle, the legislature is free to specify those components of social
situations that constitute a similarity or dissimilarity between such
situations. Accordingly, such elements may supply a rational basis for
equal or unequal treatment. As already noted, the Court has held
that the legislature may legitimately bring about the operation of a
criterion ofjustice in a particular domain.
The final step in the sequence reintroduces substance. This step
is representative of the core of the arbitrariness standard. As under
the arbitrariness standard, legislative discretion comes to an end'
where the differences (or "peculiariies")-existing independently of
the legislative appraisal of the situation-are of such significance that
they must be taken into account from the standpoint of justice.
Composed of the two elements of "significance" and "the assumption
(30). In contrast to the arbitrariness standard, the new type of review embodied a "strict" proportionality test and in effect extended the range ofjudicial control of legislation. See id. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether resorting to proportionality would indeed entail a more searching
inquiry. In the context of rights jurisprudence some constitutional scholars have argued repeatedly that the very same principle operates as a softener of constitutional provisions, which
opens the door for almost any form of interference with basic rights. See, e.g., Friedrich E.
Schapp, Die Verhdltnismfligkeit des Grundrechtseingiffs, in JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 850, 850
(1980); ERNST FORSTHOFF, DER STAAT DER INDUsTIE-GESELLSCHAFr 139-40 (1971). For an
overview of the debate, see Detlef Marten, Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Herleitung des Verhijitnismdfiigkeitsprinzips, in FUR STAAT UND REcHT (= Festschrift Heribert Schambeck) 349-79 U.
Hengstschldger & H.F. K6ck, eds., Humblot 1994).
My formulation suggests that the question of whether the latter has been
overruled by the
former is entirely one of interpretation. See generally Stanley Fish, Still Wrong after All These Years,
6 LAWAND PHILOSOPHY 401-18 (1987).
1
This sequence can be gleaned from BVerfGE decisions prior to the New Formula.
See, e.g.,
BVerfGE 12, 326 (337); BVerfGE 17, 319 (330); BVerfGE 50, 177 (186-87); BVerfGE 54, 11

(36 .
1

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 144-145.
See BVerfGE 1, 264 (276) (an early formulation).
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of the standpoint of justice," this final step in the sequence reintroduces substance in a way that also stresses institutional competence.
It is only in instances in which both elements are satisfied that legislative discretion must yield to judicial opinion. In this respect, the core
of the arbitrariness standard promises to reconcile the substantive
and institutional components ofjudidal review.'
Contrary to both the comparative and the official account, ' - one
can plausibly maintain that, upon closer inspection, the New Formula
and its progeny may have resulted from the judicial attempt to clarify
the conditions under which the significance and standpoint ofjustice
elements serve to vindicate the judicial control of legislation."t On
the other hand, as indicated above, the German Court may have
thought that a reference to quasi-suspect differential treatment of
groups - a reference which has a strong American connotation in the
German context-is necessary in order to extend the proportionality
principle to the field of equal protection.
As always in the context of a historical reconstruction, an examination of cases decided immediately before the appearance of the
New Formula is instructive. For example, prior to the promulgation
of the New Formula, the German Court held that the legislature must
recognize those similarities between groups that are of such significance that they must be taken into account from the standpoint of
justice.18 The significance of group difference - a factor which is important enough to engender heightened judicial scrutiny under the
New Formula - was already foreshadowed. One can speculate, therefore, that the New Formula initially amounted to nothing more than
a judicial specification of the two elements: "significance" and "assuming the standpoint ofjustice." With the New Formula, the Court
established that, other things aside, the former element, "significance," designates a "differential treatment of groups" and the latter,
"assuming the standpoint ofjustice," designates the finding of the absence or presence of "reasons of such a kind and weight as to warrant
the differential treatment.' 9 Viewed in this light, one should be wary
of the official account that takes for granted that the replacement of
old phrases such as "taking the perspective of justice" and "a sound
reason" with the new slogan "reasons having a certain weight"
amounts to an incorporation of the proportionality principle.
Confusion concerning the application of equal protection formulae was compounded by the strategy adopted by the Second Senate to
condense both the "significance" and the "the viewpoint of justice"
elements into one simple standard that ties judicial scrutiny to the
18

SeeHeun, supranote 12, at 254 (RZ 43).

18 See supra sections III and X.

16 Heun argues for a similar position. See Heun, supra note 12, at 242 (RZ 20).
18 See, &g., BVerfGE 50, 177 (186); BVerfGE
54, 11 (25-26).
'90 Compare BVerfGE 55,72 (88)
ith BVerfGE 22, 387 (415) and 52,277 (280).
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"peculiarities of the social situation."1 91 In fact, the Second Senate
also understood that the scope of legislative freedom varies according
to the subject matter of the regulation. Moreover, it held that the
guidance provided by the nature of things, although of different intensity, emerges from the internal arrangement of social relationships
as they tacitly and continuously evolve over time.'92 Of course, this
fairly Burkean string of precedents is merely the product of a very robust reading of the arbitrariness standard. This article posits, therefore, that the official account is wrong on both counts. Neither the
First nor the Second Senate's practice of equal protection review reveals that the principle of proportionality is of any genuine importance. 193
Before introducing the most recent developments, I would like to
draw attention to a decision that sought to have it both ways. The decision discussed both the New Formula and the "peculiarities of historically given social relationships."1 94 A look at this example demonstrates that the New Formula could have been integrated into the old
arbitrariness standard, although this did not occur. In addition,
against the backdrop of a criterion of justice, the example may also
shed some light on the distinction between the mere means-ends test
and the control of the means of classification test. 195
XII.

AN INTERMEDIATE STEP

In an instructive case, the German Court dealt with a statute
which treated full-time and part-time public officials differently with
respect to an additional payment that, owing to their marital status,
they were eligible to receive. Two part-time judges who were also
spouses together received less then half of the additional payment,
while every full-time public official was entitled to the full amount.9 '
The Court began its analysis with an invocation of the second proposition of the New Formula T_ assuming the standpoint of justicestating that the legislature has broad discretion in matters relating to
the installment of public officials. The German Court then identified
the statute's twin purposes of taking marital status into account only
once and of disproportionately reducing the relative benefit for pub191See, e.g., BVerfGE 75, 108 (156).

19 See id. at 158-59.
19SSee Hesse, Der ailgemeine Gleichheitssatz, supra note 16, at 127-28, 130.
See supra section Ifor

a discussion of the rationale of this principle. In the context of the judicial invocation of a criterion ofjustice, the normative productivity of balancing seems to be out of place. The criterion is
simply alleged to exist and then applied to a piece of legislation. However, this proves to be a
bit more complicated. The difference between formulation and application is systematically
indeterminate in the context of equal protection review.
194

SeeBVerfGE 71, 39 (52).

See Heun, supra note 12, at 244-45 (RZ 25).
See BVerfGE 71, 39 (52) and the prior decision BVerfGE 49, 260 (272).
197 See supra section
XI.
195
196
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lic officials who only worked part-time.'. In its reconstruction of legislative intent, the German Court imputed both a purpose and an effect to the statute,1' inferring that the legislature "evidently" did not
establish the criterion of distributing benefits according to the
amount of work performed for the employer.P' The absence of a
genuinely meritocratic principle, the Court found, wras manifest in
the statute."'
The traditional rational basis test would have terminated here.
The Court, however, applied both the preferred robust reading of
the arbitrariness standard and the New Formula in order to determine whether it was legitimate to disregard the internal reciprocity
between workload and payment.L2 Explicitly, the Court stated that it
had already identified a purpose behind the statute's differential
treatment. The disproportionate reduction of the benefit, as well as
an underlying normative criterion, was warranted on the basis parttime status. Yet, the Court found that the differential treatment
could not be deemed constitutional simply because the legislature
had taken this difference into account.25' The opinion further provides a robust reading of the core of the arbitrariness standard by an
incantation of "pre-established differences," the "nature of things,"
and the "internal composition of the social situation," as well as by a
citation to the New Formula.20 This dictum brings an entirely different perspective to bear on the meaning of "significance" and "standpoint ofjustice. 2 9 '
Nonetheless, from such compounded premises as these, the Court
reached the conclusion that the unequal treatment of different
groups of public officials was firmly rooted in the nature of public
employment. 2° This reasoning echoes a familiar Prussian esprit de
corps. First, working as a public official demands full-time employment, since public officials devote their entire lives to the state. Accordingly, public officials working on a half-time basis are an irregu198SeeBVerfGE 71, 39 (54).
199 In commenting on the United State Supreme Court's analysis of a similar economic package,Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting opinion that the Court could not critically analyze
the rational relationship of a statute to its goal if the Court imputed the goal from the effect of
the statute. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166. 187 (1980) (Brennan.
J., dissenting):
But by presuming purpose from result, the Court reduces analysis to tautology. It may alxa)s be said that Congress intended to do what it in fact
did. If that were the extent of our analysis, we would find every statute, no
matter how arbitrary or irrational, perfectly tailored to achieve its purpose.
" See BVerfGE 71, 39 (55).

See id.

See id. Evidently, the question of whether the means comply ivith a standard and whether
the purpose is a legitimate one are the same.
SeeBVerfGE 71, 39 (57-58).
See id. at 58-59.
2
See id See also suprasection XI.
-06 SeeBVerfGE 71, 39 (60-63).
2
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larity, a disagreeable exception. Second, since the whole-hearted
dedication of one's life to the state corresponds to the duty on the
part of the state to pay "alimony" -

and not a salary -

to the public

official, the principle of reciprocity between labor and payment
would be out of place. Thus, the Court upheld the statute by finding
an acceptable rationale for treating part-time workers differently
from full-time workers.
XIII.

THE MOST RECENT FORMULA

In the past few years the evolution of the equal protection standard has not been as transparent as the public official example discussed above seems to suggest.0 7 On the contrary, attempts to arrive
at a unified standard have persisted, and have mirrored the ordinary
circumstances of judicial review. Yet, one can observe some trends.
The judiciary, for example, subjects legislation to a more searching
inquiry if the legislation "affects" other basic rights,0 s or if it burdens
particular groups. At the other end of the continuum, a much more
relaxed standard exists for legislation involving the detailed construc-

tion of a system of positive entitlements2 9 or, as has always been the
case, in the field of economic regulation. Some commentators,
therefore, have posited the evolution of a two-tiered scheme of general equal protection review which incorporates the proportionality
principle on its higher level, triggered by treatments that are suspect
because
they affect single groups or burden other constitutional
210
rights.
In 1993, the First Senate, most likely motivated by both the
aforementioned developments and the related scholarly commentary, attempted to develop another new formula.'
For the sake of
the distinction, this article shall refer to it as the "Most Recent Formula. 212 Beyond providing another schematic matrix, however, the
opinion of the First Senate developed what amounted to a nutshell
theory of equal protection review.
Surprisingly, the First Senate's reflections did not, as its pedigree
and its progeny might have suggested, integrate the original -and
now more dated-New Formula into the arbitrariness standard. On

See Hesse, DeralgemeineGleichheitssatz, supra note 16, at 123.
See supra note 162; BVerfGE 67, 348 (365); BVerfGE 71, 364 (384). For a first express
statement of that principle, see BVerfGE 77, 9 (24). See also Currie, Lochner Abroad, supra note
17, at 278.
209See e.g, BVerfGE 87, 1 (36-39).
210 See Hesse, Der algemeine Gleichheitssatz, supra note 16,
at 127; MaaB, supra note 16, at 18;
Hesse, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS, supra note 104, at 190 (RZ 439). For a more con207

208

structive account, see HUSTER, REcHTE UND ZIELE, supra note 33.
211See BVerfGE 88, 87 (96). Almost the same wording can be found
in a decision from June
h
8" , 1993, in 1 NEUEJURISTISCHEWOCHENSCHRIFT 122 (1994).

212See Herzog, supranote 169, at 381-382.
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the contrary, the First Senate drew a sharp line on the grounds that
each theory set a distinct limit for legislative discretion.2 ' It is apparent from the First Senate's opinion that the introduction of a split between the ordinary (lower) and the new (higher) tier of review resulted from a "creative misreading"2 14 of the scattered body of
precedents, to put the matter mildly. It may well be that the "best"
interpretation of the relevant legal materials has not yet been
crafted.1
XIV.

THE COURT'S OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

The Most Recent Formula redefines the core of equal protection.
As we have seen, its ancestor resulted from an interpretation that explained the core of the arbitrariness standard with reference to differences between groups that have a certain "weight." The Most Recent Formula begins with the same frame of reference as the New
Formula, declaring that the legislature's zone of discretion can be
more or less circumscribed depending upon the subject matter of
regulation and the classifying criteria employed.1 6 In practical terms,
these limits on legislative action under the Most Recent Formula,
therefore, may range from the "mere arbitrariness standard" to the
principle of "strict adherence to requirements of proportionality. "2"
More theoretically, the opinion explains that the Most Recent
Formula approach to equal protection can be derived from two
sources: First, textually, from the words and the meaning of Article
3, § 1; and, second, structurally, from Article 3, § l's relationship to
other constitutional provisions. With respect to the former textual
argument, the Court cites the premise in Article 3, § 1 that everyone
shall be equal before the law.2' As such, it follows that if the legislature treats certain groups of people differently, the statute is subject
to a more searching mode of inquiry. With respect to the latter structural argument, which alleges Arti213 With respect to the upper limit, the Most Recent Formula actually removes the traditional

core of equal protection, which was characterized by the traditional components of 'significance" and "standpoint ofjustice."
14 See HAROLD BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING 2 (1975) (describing the process of revisionist
reading, where a reader imputes his own meaning into the words of the text).
215 See RoNAI. DWORKIN, LAW's EwmHE 51, 226, 235 (1986) (noting thmt constructive interpretation requires judges to arrive at the best possible interpretation of an existing body of
precedents).
216 See BVerfGE 88, 87 (96).
217 1d&

218 See id-

SeeTHE BAsic LAw, supr note 34, at 14 ("All persons shall be equal before the law.").
See Heum, supra note 12, at 26; Magadlena P6schl, O.ber Gleidiheil und eAhdIltum.df ghit,
119JuRISTIScHE BLATER 413, 416 (1997) (critiquing this approach by arguing that since every
differential treatment eventually affects persons, one cannot plausibly distinguish between the
treatment of persons and the treatment of states of affairs).
219
22
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cle 3, § l's relationship to other constitutional provisions, the Court
refers to both the special Equal Protection Clause of Article 3, § 3 and
to the Bill of Basic Rights. 22' Thus, the Court declares that the rigidity

of the standard of review increases as the characteristics of the relevant group begin to resemble the qualities mentioned in Article 3,
§ 3.222 Surprisingly, the Court seems to be proposing a sliding-scale
approach to equal protection. Thus, the shared vision of Justices
Stevens 223 and Marshall 224 may eventually come true in Karlsruhe.
Relative to that of the German Court, the equal protection jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court reflects a more thorough familiarity with comparative constitutional law. Illustratively,
under the United States Supreme Court's reasoning, the increasing
rigidity of the arbitrariness standard in the face of "suspect" or "quasisuspect" classifications is indispensable to the protection of minorities
against hostile discrimination.2 The United States Supreme Court
also holds that heightened scrutiny should not be restricted to the direct classification of persons, but that it is also appropriate where the
treatment of a state of affairs indirectly results in the differential
treatment of groups.2

26

Of course, it is difficult to predict if this dic-

tum will be read to imply that strict scrutiny should be extended to
instances of disproportionate impact without an inquiry into discriminatory purpose.2 27 The United States Supreme Court also makes
reference to another principle of heightened scrutiny which is not
unfamiliar to students of American constitutional law: Regulation of
human action should be submitted to a stricter test if the people affected are not in a position to escape the reach of the classifying criteria through their own conduct because the criteria embodies immutable or almost immutable characteristics of persons. 22s Finally,
221

See BVerfGE 88, 87 (96-97).

2U

See id.

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with
the Supreme Court's system of levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause):
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two tiered
analysis of Equal Protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed
to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably
consistent fashion.
224 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 341-342 (1980) (Marshall,J. dissenting)
(stating his disapproval of a two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230
(1982) (Marshall,J, concurring) (reiterating his belief that a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis should be replaced with a method that allows for varying levels of scrutiny); San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 19 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting)
(same).
2Z See United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144 (1938)
2

226

See id.

227

See the following cases for examples regarding possible dillution of the minority vote in

legislative redistricting claims: Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S.Ct. 1149 (1993); Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982); and Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
22
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that a statute which affords dependency benefits to the spouses of male Air Force officers, but not the spouses of female offi-
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the United States Supreme Court refers to the effect such regulation
might have on the exercise of other basic rights. Again, legislative
discretion is narrower if the unequal treatment of persons or a state
of affairs is likely to burden the exercise of such rights. Returning to the German context, after a remarkably detailed explanation of the instances in which legislative freedom is more circumscribed, the Court continued its explication of the Most Recent
Formula by explaining that the range of legislative action exacts different standards of equal protection review.f In cases where legislative discretion is relatively wide, "merely the arbitrariness standard"
applies2 1 In essence, legislation must be struck down only if the alleged unreasonableness is "evident." "2 According to the Court, in instances where groups are treated unequally and in instances where
one can expect a negative impact on the exercise of other basic
rights, a more searching inquiry is necessary into whether reasons of
such a kind and weight that could justify the imposition of unequal
legal consequences exist.
The narrative on the development of equal protection formulae
ends here. Evidently, the Most Recent Formula represents the provisional result of the German Court's ongoing attempt to come to grips
with its own practice of review. It would be a mistake, however, to
suppose that the theory of the Most Recent Formula has acquired canonical status. Some decisions of the First Senate seem to comply
with its program.f 3 The Second Senate, however, still clings in its rulings to a markedly robust reading of the arbitrariness standard, -" and
considers the elements introduced by the New Formula as representing one of the arbitrariness standard's constituent parts.
XV.

IN DEFENSE OF THE DIE-HARD ACCOUNT

Employing its Most Recent Formula, the German Court explicitly
asserts that a strict test of proportionality should be applied to specified cases.2 One of these cases was one in which the Court reviewed
a federal statute that prohibited transsexuals from altering their first
name prior to obtaining the age of twenty-five. This is the so-called
"small solution."237 Transsexuals younger than twenty-five were al-

cers is invidiously discriminatory and violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
. SeeCurrie, LochnerAbroad, supra note 17, at 368 (noting earlier precedents).
no SeeBVerfGE 88, 87 (96-97).
231
2
2

2%

2"

See 1 NEUEJURISTIscHEWoCHENSCHRIFr 122 (1994).
SeeBVerfGE 90, 145 (195-196).
See BVerfGE 93,386 (397).
SeeBVerfGE 88,87 (96-97).
See id.
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lowed to have their sex changed through surgery, in which case the
individual's birth records would be modified to reflect the sex
change. This is the so-called "big solution. 25
The Court left no
doubt that the classification was based on personal characteristics and
that it affected the exercise of basic liberties, such as human dignity,
guaranteed by Article 1, § 1, and general freedom of action, guaranteed by Article 2, § 1.2s9 Thus, the Court raised the question of
whether one could imagine reasons, the "kind and weight" of which
would justify the unequal treatment of transsexuals below the age of
twenty-five in the simple process of name-changing.4
In contrast to its own formulaic manifesto, however, the German
Court did not engage in outright balancing. The only component of
the proportionality principle that actually appeared in the Court's
opinion was focused on the appropriateness of the legislative means.
This component, however, constitutes a rather trivial element of
equal protection review. Notwithstanding grandiose rhetorical gestures, the Court simply presupposed that the purpose of the "small
solution" was to permit experiments with one's sexual identity before
any action that would have manifestly irreversible effects was taken. 1
The prohibition of a name-change for transsexuals below the age of
twenty-five, the Court found, did not truly advance the purpose of
protecting young adults from the risks of an imprudent sex-change.
The only remedy available to this group, rather, was surgery which
carries irreversible consequences.2 4
The Court, therefore, actually
engaged in a rational basis test "with a bite," which resulted in finding
that the means chosen did not further the goal of legislation.24'
It should be noted that in the transsexuals case the Court's statement of the legislature's professed statutory goal tacitly stemmed
from the Court's own reconstruction of legislative purpose, rather
than from the government's professed end. The government explained that the age-based restriction of the "small solution" had
been enacted to prevent adolescents from prematurely devoting
themselves to a transsexual life-style. Had the Court dealt with the
government's stated purpose of the statute, perhaps something like a
test of proportionality could have been applied. Contemplating this
illiberal purpose, the Court could have argued that the classificatory
222

See id.

29

See id. at 97.
See id.
See id. at 100-01. In this respect, the "small solution" erects a safeguard against an error in

240
241

prognosis.
See id. at 100.
243 A later case, also employing the New Formula, was decided on exactly the same grounds.
See 1 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRFr 122 (1994). In another, more recent instance, the
Court simply applied the robust rationality test, referred to as the "systematic consistency variant," by examining whether the legislature had some reason to refrain from applying a prior
established criterion to a specific group, without even approaching the threshold of the proportionality test. See BVerfGE 92, 53,69 (71-72).
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means were moderately appropriate and perhaps even necessary although it is dubious why the legislature did not choose the general
age of maturity, namely eighteen years of age. Nevertheless, at the
third stage of the proportionality review, the Court would have been
committed to comparing this stated goal with the consequence that
young transsexuals who contemplated a sex change would not be
able to express this desire by changing their name, but instead would
have to undergo surgery, a far more drastic and permanent result. If
the Court had compared this consequence with the option available
to transsexuals above the age of tventy-five, the Court then could
have decided that the less burdensome alternative of a name change
should have been made available to younger transsexuals as well.2 "
Indeed, several of the cases recently decided by the German Court
still exhibit the pattern of intensified rationality review -a robust application of the arbitrariness standard-which this article has previously reconstructed.2 " The German Court continues to employ the
old subterfuges of identifying legislative purpose with substantive cri24 The reasoning for such a decision, however, might have followed at least two fairly
different tracks:
(a) The Court could have held that there were no sound arguments in favor of the differential treatment of transsexuals on the ground of their age. Since both groups are similarly
situated with respect to a psychologically hazardous endeavor, the)' would be equally deserving
of the same concern. This kind of reasoning could avoid addressing whether the adversely affected interest had to prevail over the government purpose if the benefit of the simple namechange were withheld from all transsexuals. Instead, it would establish that, at least in this context, the distinction was not sufficiently reasonable to outweigh the refutable presumption in
favor of equality. But see Westen, supra note 114, at 571-73 (arguing that the principle of equality is meaningless and empty of content, and such rhetoric should therefore be abandoned).
According to Westen's notion, the rationale of the decision would derive from two roots a
comparison of groups and the presumption that persons who are similarly or identically situated should be treated alike. As the comparison focused merely on the group of persons whose
interests, attitudes, or even sentiments were negatively affected by government action, the need
for balancing would not arise. Moreover, the quality and intensity of those factors could be left
more or less unexplored. Hence, the substance would remain indeterminate.
(b) The Court also could have focused on the statute's negative impact on the fundamental interest to engage in various experiments with one's sexual identity. In this line of reasoning,
the opinion would have to make the claim that this interest is of equal importance to transsexuals below and above the age of twenty-five and that this fundamental individual interest must
prevail over the paternalistic state goal of erecting a safeguard against the premature 'fixation
on transsexualism." Had the Court chosen this line of inquiry, it would have been forced to
embrace the criterion ofjustice, claiming that everyone of a certain age below twenty-five has a
fundamental interest in experimenting with his or her sexual identity in a manner least damaging to his or her future psychological development. This would amount to extending the benefit to an additional group of transsexuals on the ground that their equal fundamental interest
trumps a valid legislative purpose. Using this reasoning, the Court could not have avoided addressing the basic rights of human dignity and general freedom of action. Set BVerfGE 88, 87
(101). The Court then necessarily would have to acknowledge that the protection of a fundamental interest, which had been identified in the process of balancing, should be extended to a
much larger group. Such reasoning would converge with the fundamental rights strand of
Equal Protection in the United States. See CURU, THE CO.S\mTnnoN, supra note 7, at 333.
The difference in these lines ofjudicial reasoning, however, does not actually matter in
the equal protection practice in Germany.
245 Seesuprasection X.
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teria246 and of juxtaposing the means against the "peculiarities of the

situation., 247 While the German Court's descriptions have changed,
its practice has not. Formulae do not matter much. If anything, they
are a means of drawing attention away from what is actually going on
in equal protection review.
XVI.

ANALYrcAL CODA

By appealing to a New Formula of equal protection review, the
German Court began to emphasize that a differential treatment of
groups, as opposed to a mere differential treatment of a state of affairs, ought to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny. In the eyes of
proponents of a comparative account, this seems to liken the new
standard to some Carolene Products-footnote-four-type focus on the infliction of group disadvantage.20 This conceptualization would lead
to the following type of analysis:
(Part 1)
If person A who belongs to group X is treated
differently from person B who belongs to group Y, the
Court has to inquire whether there is, first, some important
interest pursued by the government, and, second, a narrowly tailored relationship between the unequal treatment
and the pursuit of that goal.
This kind of inquiry is aimed at extinguishing abuses of government power that are motivated by animosity or hostility toward certain groups.251
Upon closer inspection, therefore, the perceived Americanization
of German standards can plausibly be understood as a mere extension of one of the most prominent principles of the German Court's
home-made jurisprudence. According to the official account, it
seems as if, with respect to the differential treatment of groups, the
German Court is ready to apply the third component of the proportionality principle to equal protection review. This clearly amounts to
a balancing of the benefits and burdens of state action. For example:
(Part 2a)
If person A, who belongs to group X, is
(as a result of government action) worse off than person C, who belongs to group Y, the Court has to in246 See 1 NEUEJURISTISCHEWOCHENSCHRiFr 122 (1994).
247
248
249

See BVerfGE 90, 145 (195-96).
See Herzog, supra note 169, at 367 (RZ 7).
Under the auspices of a Carolene Products standard this difference makes sense. Con-

sider San Antonio School District v. Rodfiguez, 411 U.S. 1, n. 28 (1973), in which the disadvantage
conferred by a statute may have had an affect on poor school districts (which could be comprised of rich and poor people), but was not directly aimed at poor people.
250 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(stating that laws directed at "discrete and insular" minorities may prevent the political process from working and,
thus, these laws may require a heightened standard of review).
5 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (noting
that "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect").
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quire whether the public interest pursued by the government is important enough to outweigh the relative
disadvantage suffered by members of group X.
The meaning of "relative disadvantage" in this type of case is unsettled. For example it is unclear whether it means a disadvantage
understood in deontological terms, following from the moral harm
inflicted by the differential treatment, or instead whether it means a
disadvantage understood in consequentialist terms, following from
the resulting inferior level of well-being. In adopting the proportionality principle, the judicial inquiry would not be primarily concerned
with identifying uses of government power which are motivated by
animosity or hostility toward certain groups, but rather, whether it is
reasonable that members of group X suffer relative deprivation for
the benefit of all. Such a reading of the New Formula's standard
would conform with a transformation of the proportionality principle
into equal protection review. The third component of proportionality is usually understood to demand that the public benefit obtained
by a regulation ought not be out of proportion to the burden imposed.
At the same time, the German Court has occasionally given an interesting twist to this proportionality requirement in the area of
equal protection. Apparently, consistent with the first formulation of
the New Formula, the Court asserts that differences between groups,
and not the public benefit, could have sufficient weight in order to
warrant unequal treatment. Accordingly, the judicial standard suggests:
If person A, who belongs to group X, is
(Part 2b)
treated differently from person B, who belongs to
group Y, then the Court has to inquire whether the
differences between group X and Y are significant
enough to support the differential treatment.
One may well wonder whether such a standard can really be understood to be an extension of the proportionality principle, because,
as this article attempts to explain with respect to the formula's pedigree, the emphasis is not on the relative weight of the public interest
or the infringement of the right, but on the significance of the differences between groups. Whereas Part 2a (the first reading of proportionality in the field of equal protection) focuses on the importance,
or "compelling" quality of the government interest, Part 2b (the second reading) highlights the relationship between the attainment of
any public objective and the different situations faced by groups. The
second reading of Part 2b would have us ask whether the perceived
difference between groups is either sufficiently plausible or too tenuous to render government action rational. What purports to be a
proportionality standard, therefore, turns out to be nothing other
than a concealed replica of the rational basis test.
This confusing transformation of domestic doctrine is mainly car-
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ried out on the level of the formulae of judicial review. Still, an
equally plausible case can be made for the fact that there remains a
shrouded disparity between what the Court claims to do on the level
of formulaic representations and what it does when deciding a particular case. In particular cases, the reasoning seems to amount to
the following:
(Part 3)
If A, who belongs to group X, is treated
differently from B, who belongs to group Y, then the
unequal treatment must not violate a criterion of justice, such as the principle that like cases be treated
alike or that each case be considered according to its
own merits.
This article has argued that the latter type of reasoning is the
hallmark of a more robust understanding of the good old arbitrariness standard. 2
XVII.

CONCLUSION: WHITHER HIGHER LAW?

The emerging picture of a difference between the formulaic explanations of general judicial standards and the ways in which cases
are actually resolved by the German Court speaks to the fact that the
pursuit of formulaic expositions can become detached from the actual resolution of the issue before the Court. It seems as if there are
two more or less independent spheres of constitutional law: the
sphere of judicial action and the sphere of judicial representation of
action.
Should one be concerned about these separate spheres? Is this a
disquieting result, or should it be? Misapplication of formulae occasionally happens. One would not want to blame the judicial contemplation of formulae for any misapplication that may occur, however.
After all, formulae not only explain the meaning of a constitution,
but also serve as a restraint on judicial decision making. 3
Formulae conspicuously lack a statute-like quality in that they do
not have a textual basis that is beyond the reach ofjudicial reasoning.
On the contrary, formulae are precedents of a second-order; they are
open to revision and improvement on a case-by-case basis. It is not
surprising that the effort to arrive at precise articulation of formulae
may tend to obscure the constitutional issue before the Court.5 " The

elaboration of formulae, therefore, involves a paradox. As Nagel correctly points out, the quest for the proper construction of formulae
"reflects intellectual embarrassment about the existence of judicial
252 See supra section

VII.
SeeNAGEL, supranote 14, at 136, 142-44 (explaining that rules must be sufficiently detailed
and schematic to bind judges who otherwise might seem beyond the law).
See id. at 137 ("If in part the Constitution means what judges want it to mean, the
Court is
obliged to attempt to convince others that its choices are desirable.").
25
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discretion, but is designed to assure plentiful opportunities for its exercise. " 25
At the same time, formulae do have a somewhat statute-like quality in that they allow for the assessment and re-evaluation of precedents as well as for the immediate exercise of flexible balancing
tests.2 In this respect, they are higher lawmaking devices. Tinkering
with formulae ostensibly reflects our unwritten constitutional rule of
judicial self-authorization. Elaborating the formula, in particular with
reference to a foreign7 example, reflects indifference to the underlying substantive issue. In fact, as idols of constitutional law, formulae are precise representations of this indifference, given that they
are often at once too specific and too simple for the range of cases
that they are designed to solve.2
Formulae constitute a second order of constitutional law. They
both assume and do not assume the role of a constitutional statute.
Formulae are supreme legal rules and are not supreme legal rules at
the same time.2H- It is not surprising that the German Court's failure
to acknowledge what is actually occurring in its own application of
formulae does not necessarily affect their exposition. Moreover,
formulae are not only designed to govern adjudication; they are also
defined by it. The matter of settling an emerging divergence between the formula and the rationale governing adjudication may be
left to an observer who is in the same position as the Court observing
its practice. Such an observer may be forced to admit that the proportionality principle was specified by the Court in the moment it was
transformed to the field of equal protection. Accordingly, one could
argue that the proportionality principle has acquired a different
meaning through a transaction relying on borrowing to provide the
suitable vector. It is only the Court which is at liberty to either make
judicial reasoning conform to the formula or to adjust the formula to
what is really at issue in adjudication, or to leave existing divergences
as they are.
Endorsing such a liberty on the part of the Court presupposes a
commitment that the account offered here is evidently unwilling to
make. One would have to subscribe to the unwritten rule ofjudicial
self-authorization. It may well be that we have reason to welcome the
20 Id. at 147 (arguing that formulae allow the Court to analyze issues in different ways and
thus emphasize the "range of choices available to the Court").
2%See iU.at 148 (stating that using formulae gives the Court a sort of regulatory role as wecll
because formulae are used in deciding how problems in society should be handled).

For a related critique, see RONALD DWORKw, FREEDOMS LW: THE MORAL RE-ADLNG OF
THE AERfICAN CONSTiTUTION 35-36 (1996) (arguing that abstract legal principles defy the
structures that formulae impose).
2s SeeNAGEL, suprn note 14, at 151 ("As cases continue to arise, however, the variety of possi25

ble fact configurations gradually becomes more and more difficult to ignore.").
See gneralyJAcQUES DERRIDA, LL~tnT:D INc. 53 (1988) (explaining that iteration of language "implies both identity and difference," and, thus this repeated examination of formulae
both idealizes and weakens the meaning of formulae).
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disappearance of the final traces of constraint resulting from the analytical sweep of our received legal vocabulary; yet, the author is ready
to admit that he does not think that there is any such reason.

